2013

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It seems like a rather basic 1-L contract law proposition, but it bears repeating.  If you want a particular term in your contract, get it in writing.  A recent drug bulk supplier case bears this
out – and some unknown contract lawyer out there is probably feeling some heat because of it. The situation in

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Reed Smith won two separate decisions in New Jersey yesterday. One of them, In re NuvaRing Litigation, No. Ber-L-3081-09, slip op. (N.J. Super. L.D. April 19, 2013), we’re not at liberty to discuss, but if you’re on our side, you won’t be disappointed reading it – in all its 91-page splendor.

The other, decision,

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A while ago, when we posted primarily about TwIqbal and removed complaints, we commented briefly on a different, but related question – whether TwIqbal (that is to say the Supreme Court’s landmark pleading decisions in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal) also applied to a fraudulent joinder evaluation of a plaintiff’s allegations for purposes of remand.  We said that we didn’t think so, but that there wasn’t much law, and left it at that.  We recently returned to this same issue after being tapped for some in-firm (this is the Reed Smith side) continuing legal education on removal issues.

It turns out that, while we’d still say application of TwIqbal is a minority position in the remand/fraudulent joinder context, it’s better backed precedentially than we had previously thought.  In a couple of circuits it is backed (at least arguably) by pre-TwIqbal appellate precedent authorizing use of Rule 12 standards in fraudulent joinder cases.  See Simpson v. Thomure, 484 F.3d 1081, 1084 (8th Cir. 2007); Smallwood v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2003).Continue Reading TwIqbal In The Remand Context?

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This is our second post in as many months about Dr. Blond and the Trasylol MDL, and he’s not faring any better in April than he did in March.  Of course, with a name like Blond, we thought of all the “blondisms” in our culture.  We opted to take the high road and go

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We don’t know how to mind our own business.
‘Cause the whole world’s got to be just like us.
Now we are fighting a war over there
No matter who wins, you know we can’t pay the cost.

Steppenwolf, “Monster.”

Some might say that John Kay’s musical biopic of American history is as true today

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In our day job, we generally rely on final decisions of FDA about things like drug approvals, device clearances, and rules and guidances.  We also rely on the general integrity of the FDA’s processes.  Even when there are things we do not like on the merits, like observations in form 483s or warnings letters—each is not a final determination of anything according to FDA—we often look to the process itself, which can include a number of steps after the offending statement or action is final.

We also find ourselves calling to the Congressional charge of FDA to protect public health and its various powers of enforcement as counters to the plaintiff charges that FDA’s actions or actions do not amount to condoning our client’s conduct.  Even when we read reports like IOM’s panning aspects of FDA, we still find ourselves looking at the process for the product in our case, with (we hope) thorough evaluation of evidence, layers of review, and consistency in reasoning.

The underlying facts in Ivy Sports Medicine, LLC v. Sebelius, No. 11-cv-1006 (RLW), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51763 (D.D.C. April 10, 2013), test even our somewhat slanted view of things.  The case came up on dueling summary judgment motions on an Administrative Procedures Act (APA) review of an FDA decision on a medical device.  We have posted on cases in a similar posture before and noted the tension we, as a drug and device products defense lawyers, feel when FDA screws up.  In Ivy, the court is asked to decide whether FDA has inherent authority to correct what it considered a massive screw-up and whether it behaved rationally—as opposed to arbitrarily and capriciously—in its correction.  In other words, as a big-boned Colorado kid would demand respect for his authority in any situation, is FDA’s inherent authority to be respected when it takes unusual steps to correct a prior abuse of its authority?Continue Reading Respecting FDA’s (Inherent) Authority

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One of the avowed purposes of the blog is to make available to all defense lawyers the kind of extremely detailed legal research that that we large firm lawyers frequently end up doing.  After all, a win anywhere helps defendants everywhere.  Sometimes we’ve done this research ourselves; sometimes we’ve come across research done by others. 

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The Aredia/Zometa case of Guenther v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50945 (M.D. Fl. Apr. 9, 2013), produced another interesting decision last week.  Not necessarily good, but interesting.  The defense moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn-based claims for failure to satisfy the proximate causation element of the learned intermediary doctrine.  Id

Huggins v. Stryker Corp., 2013 WL 1191058 (D. Minn. March 25, 2013), is another opinion that puts the “pain” in “pain pump litigation.”  It’s also another example of a court putting the cart before the horse, a theme raised in Eric’s post yesterday.  The opinion addresses three motions:  Plaintiff’s motion to transfer the