2013

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We saw this morning that the boxcar California verdict that was being ballyhooed the last couple of days was reversed by the trial judge granting a nonsuit (the California equivalent to judgment n.o.v.).  But we don’t usually discuss verdicts, good or bad.  Now we’ve received the opinion supporting that decision.  It’s Cooper v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals America, Inc., LASC No. JCCP4696, slip op. (Cal Super. L.A. Co. May 1, 2013).  Opinions, we discuss.

Basically, the plaintiff’s case fell apart because the causation opinions of the only plaintiff expert witness were so unsupported as to border on farcical.  The court deferred ruling on the defendant’s Kelly/Frye (should we now add Sargon to the name?) exclusion motion and let the case go to the jury – no doubt hoping that the jury would do the right thing.  Unfortunately, the jury fell for the snow job, so the court stepped in.

Cooper is the latest example of the routine abuse of “differential diagnosis/etiology” by plaintiff causation expert.  Here the disease was bladder cancer, which has a number of other known and idiopathic causes.  Unfortunately for plaintiff Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California, 288 P.3d 1237 (Cal. 2012) (discussed here), recently reiterated that, yes, the rules governing admissibility of expert testimony actually have teeth.  Cooper, slip op. 5-6 (quoting extensively from Sargon).

This particular diagnosis failed because (no surprise) the expert didn’t have all of the relevant medical records and thus didn’t know all of the necessary information about the other causes (“[p]articularly smoking, environmental exposures, occupational exposure,” slip op. at 7) for bladder cancer as they related to this individual.  While the expert told the jury that he had “reviewed the medical history, id. at 10, he actually hadn’t:

Q.   And yet, Dr. Smith, sir, despite reading those records, you were totally unaware that they were records reporting that [plaintiff] had stopped smoking in the 1990’s. Isn’t that true, sir?

A.   There’s discrepancies within the chart which we talked about before. There are places in the chart that say never smoker. There are also places that say 1990’s.

Q.   Doctor, I’m going to ask you a specific question. Isn’t it true that as of the time we took your deposition, you were unaware of any record reporting that he had stopped in the 1990’s?

A.   My impression was that he had stopped in the 1970’s, correct

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Q ….[Y]ou can then agree that for purposes of forming your opinion, you did not weigh whether and to what extent if he smoked for 20 years or 40 years would factor into your opinion because you didn’t know then. Isn’t that true?

A.   I was under the impression,·once again, that he had quit in 1974. I was not aware of any documentation at that time of 1990 something.Continue Reading Breaking News – Opinion Reversing $6.5 Million Actos Verdict

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Long time blog subscribers surely remember our co-founder, Mark Herrmann, who wrote for the blog for over three years, until late 2009.  Then, for his own good and sufficient reasons, he gave up the practice of product liability litigation and went in house at Aon, the insurance giant.  For a while, Mark stayed

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Once again, we’ve been asked to shill for a DRI Drug and Medical Device meeting.  Since we’re defense side shills by nature, we are only too happy to oblige.  Here goes:

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It is that time of year again.  Trees blooming, people sneezing, and the Drug and Device defense bar is getting ready for the

This post is from the Reed Smith side of the blog only – the Dechert lawyers were not involved.

The Iowa Court of Appeals has affirmed summary judgment entered in favor of both branded and generic manufacturers of metoclopramide, looking at Mensing’s effect on both in the process.  In Huck v. Trimark Physicians Group,

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We hadn’t blogged about the Biomaterials Access Assurance Act (“BAAA”), 21 U.S.C. §§1601-1606, since 2008 (see post), and now we are posting about it for a second time this month.  Maybe we should hashtag BAAA and see if we can start a Google trend.  Maybe not.

Our prior posts focused on the BAAA’s procedural device that allows a biomaterial supplier to be dismissed upon a showing that the supplier is not a “manufacturer” of the final implant, is not a “seller” of the final implant, and did not fail “to meet applicable contractual requirements” relating to the raw material. 21 U.S.C. §1604(a).  While this latest case, Sadler v. Advanced Bionics, LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54697 (W.D. Ken. Apr. 16, 2013), deals with that as well, it also addresses the preemptive effect of the BAAA.  This is also a case where the claim against the biomaterial supplier was brought by the medical device manufacturer, the defendant, rather than the plaintiff — which is why the court got the preemption issue.

It is important to the preemption discussion to know that Kentucky has adopted comparative fault/several liability for all tort actions, including products liability.  Id. at *7-8.   “In all tort actions, including products liability actions, involving fault of more than one (1) party . . . the court . . . shall instruct the jury to . . . indicat[e] . . . the percentage of the total fault of all the parties to each claim.”  Ken. Rev. Stat. §411.182.  So, in this case, defendant Advanced Bionics sought such an apportionment instruction that would direct the jury to consider the degree of fault of Astro Seal, its biomaterials supplier (Advanced Bionics’ third-party complaint against Astro Seal had previously been dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction).  Id. at *1.Continue Reading Twice in One Month

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Several of us (the Reed Smith side, obviously) recently attended the firm partners’ retreat. All our brainstorming about how to improve client service started us thinking about the blog.  In some ways, legal blogging’s not that much different than other legal services – we just don’t get paid for it, at least not directly.  Our intended readership follows us, to the extent they do, with the expectation (realistic, we hope) of learning things that they can use to help defeat drug/device product liability litigation.  That brings value to the industry (and indirectly to various clients), since a win anywhere helps defendants everywhere.

So where can we bring, or at least preserve, value to the industry/our clients through the blog? We thought about MDLs.  Defendants spend a great deal of money slogging their way through MDLs, and where possible we’d like to preserve whatever good we get out of them.  Depending on judicial predilection (Judge Bechtle didn’t; Judge Weinstein does), MDLs often include summary judgment and (less frequently) other dispositive motions concerning individuals or groups of plaintiffs.  Some of the motions are based on Daubert, but if not, they’re usually based on state law – learned intermediary, statute of limitations, other issues.

So what?

Here’s what. State-law-based rulings in MDLs involve judges in one jurisdiction, like Judge Weinstein in New York in Zyprexa, deciding issues presented by other states’ laws – say whether a failure to warn was causal under Louisiana law.  That’s fine for the MDL, but what about the rest of us?  Also, what about anybody after an MDL is (at long last) concluded?  What legal researcher would think to look in New York for a case possibly presenting a relevant fact pattern for a Louisiana motion?

Not too many.

We speak from experience.  When we’re putting together a summary judgment motion in some other case, whether one-off or a different MDL, where do we look for supportive precedent?  Why we look in the logical place, of course – the decisions of that particular state’s courts and federal decisions in the district and appellate courts responsible for that state.  That’s where we get the most bang for our research bucks. That’s doing our clients’ work in the most efficient manner.

So we don’t look in Florida, or New York, or Pennsylvania if we’re working on a case under Texas law.  It’s simply not cost effective, given the number of other jurisdictions and the relatively low likelihood of success.  Sometimes we run across something significant through checking lists of citations (colloquially known as “Shepardizing”) to relevant cases, but we’re not systematic.

But just because it’s not worthwhile in a given case to conduct such broader searches doesn’t mean that what’s out there isn’t worth knowing about.  In Zyprexa alone, Judge Weinstein granted dozens of summary judgments applying the law of at least half the states of the union. Those cases are useful precedent – if defense counsel can locate them in a way that doesn’t waste the client’s money.

That’s where we come in.  We’re bloggers.  We’re not getting paid for this.  We don’t have to be cost effective in the narrow sense that lawyers working for client X or client Y have to be.  We just have to do the research – and we have.

What follows will be incredibly boring to many of you, but we hope equally useful.  We’ve collected individual summary judgment decisions (unless we specify a different procedural posture) in various MDLs – no matter what jurisdiction they were in.  We’ve organized them by state, omitting decisions made by MDL courts applying their own forum’s law, since those cases would be found by searching “the usual suspects.” That means, if you’re researching Mississippi law, just look under “Mississippi law cases” in the list below, and there are the cases, no matter what MDL court decided them.

Caveat #1: As we’ve said many times, we don’t do the other side’s research for them.  These lists include only cases where the defendant won everything (or almost everything) under a particular state’s law.  As far as adverse MDL precedent is concerned, we make no representations whatsoever.  Yeah, we saw some bad cases while doing this research.  We’ve intentionally omitted them.

Caveat #2. We expect this list is under-inclusive. Why? To keep the searches manageable, we reviewed only cases where “product liability” appeared in the name of the case (the usual way that MDLs are named), and “[insert state name] law” appeared somewhere in the body of the opinion.  That means we searched “Alabama law,” not just “Alabama.”  Otherwise, we’d have gotten hits for every MDL case where one of the (often scores) of attorneys was from Alabama.  Still, we think our results are a lot better than nothing. We’re not aware of this kind of list having been compiled anywhere – at least anywhere that’s public.

Caveat #3. We’ve only included issues that we could see possibly arising in drug and device product liability litigation. If an MDL decision was favorable to the defendant only on, say, asbestos exposure product identification (the most common example by far), we have not included it.

Caveat #4. We have not included decisions that were driven by federal issues, such as Daubert or preemption.  Federal issues involve different research considerations, so that decisions from MDLs in different circuits are less useful.

So here goes. For the first time anywhere, pro-defense product liability MDL decisions organized by the jurisdiction of the law being applied.Continue Reading MDL Precedent Rescue – Big List

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People usually think it’s a good thing to be “on a roll.”  But that is not always the case.  We have defended client depositions where there was nothing worse than a witness on a roll, especially if that was a roll of Yeses (“Q:  You have worked at the company since 2002, right?  A:  Yes.  Q:  And you obtained a degree in biochemistry from Rollins College, right?  A:  Yes. Q:  And you think puppies are adorable, don’t you?  A: Yes.  Q:  And your company has a responsibility to warn of all known risks, right?  A:  Yes.  Q:  And your IFU omits a number of key risks, doesn’t it?  A:  Yes.  Q:  And don’t you hate it when people talk during movies?  A:  Yes.  Q:  And the court ought to direct a verdict against your company, right?  A: Yes.  Q:  And would it be fair to say that this is a splendid case for punitive damages?  A:  Yes.  Q:  And don’t you agree that an Audemars Piguet Royal Oak watch would look great on my wrist, especially if that wrist was wrapped around the wheel of a Maserati Quattroporte?  A:  Yes.”  Etc.)

Sometimes courts can get on a bad roll, too.  When a court is determined to deny a defense motion to dismiss claims, it will find a way to tube every argument in sight, even those oozing merit.  That’s what happened in Hwang v. OHSO Clean, Inc., 2013 WL 1632697 (N.D. Cal. April 16, 2013).  In Hwang, the plaintiff brought a purported class action on behalf of a nationwide class of consumers who purchased the defendants’ sanitizing products.  The issue was whether the labels on the cleaners overstated the efficacy of the products – by saying, for example, that the cleaners “kill 99.9% of the harmful germs that can make you sick.” The legal claims sounded in various theories, including: 1) breach of express warranty; 2) deceit; 3) concealment; (4) False Advertising Law (“FAL”); 5) California’s notorious Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”); 5) Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”); and 6) the federal Magnuson Moss Act.

In their Motion to Dismiss, the defendants contended that all of the plaintiff’s claims were preempted under the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (our beloved “FDCA,” the hook that permits us to discuss a case that is otherwise far afield from our usual stuff) and/or foreclosed by Pom Wonderful LLC v. v. Coca-Cola Co., 678 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2012), a case that we have commented on (here, for example) at least as many times as we have enjoyed the fine beverages manufactured by either Pom Wonderful or the Coca-Cola Company. Here is a little pause to refresh your memory of that case:  in Pom Wonderful the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s Lanham Act claim that the defendant’s juice product label was misleading was barred by the FDCA and the regulations promulgated thereunder by the FDA, because those regulations indicated that the FDA had already considered and spoken to what content a label must bear and had apparently authorized the defendant’s labeling. The Pom Wonderful decision was really about the doctrine of primary jurisdiction more
than preemption.  It was still pretty wonderful.Continue Reading A Stale Roll and a Dismal Clean Sweep

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It has been about two months since we first posted about the swell of class action litigation over honey.  Your homework at that time was to watch The Bee Movie while we watched the honey litigation.  We did our part.  Which is how we found Perea v. Walgreen Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53404