Bexis is known to say that nothing good ever comes out of Missouri, but the Missouri Supreme Court has proven him wrong.  We have long made exceptions to Bexis’ proclamation for Mark Twain, Maya Angelou, and Kansas City barbeque, and we can now add to that list the Missouri Supreme Court’s new opinion in State

Literally for decades plaintiffs in mass torts have employed the business model of flooding jurisdictions seen as friendly to them with more solicited plaintiffs than any court system can possibly handle.  They have employed every forum-shopping trick in the book to trap defendants in these jurisdictions, which usually have no relationship to any party.  After

This is a follow-up to our post last week on the Missouri Supreme Court’s momentous personal jurisdiction decision in State ex rel. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Dolan, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2017 WL 770977 (Mo. Feb. 28, 2017) (“NSRC”).  We stated last week, and we continue to believe, that NSRC will ultimately kill litigation tourism in Missouri.

However, it won’t be easy.  Nothing ever is against the rich and entrenched litigation industry.

As we would expect, the other side is talking out both sides of its mouth about NSRC.

On one hand, in the ongoing legislative push for a statutory fix to the bizarre and unfair way that courts have interpreted Missouri’s venue and joinder rules (see our post here), those supporting the other side of the “v.” are already claiming that the venue/joinder reform bill (H.B. 460 – which will be on the House floor this week) is no longer necessary; that NSRC supposedly “fixed” everything.

On the other hand, and essentially simultaneously, in the multi-plaintiff mass tort litigation that is the main reason tort reform is so desperately needed, they’re doing the opposite –  trying to get around NSRC by claiming “pendent party” jurisdiction as a result of the very same venue/joinder problems that venue/joinder reform and H.B. 460 is intended to fix.

Talk is cheap.  Watch what they do, not what they say.

They can’t have it both ways. In fact, they can’t have it either way.  The plaintiffs’ first position is garbage, and the second is devoid of legal support.

For the reasons stated in our original post, H.B.460 remains necessary after NSRC.  NSRC established that personal jurisdiction over non-resident corporations by non-resident plaintiffs over injuries not arising in Missouri is unconstitutional under the Due Process clause.  There is no general personal jurisdiction because the defendant is not “at home.”  There is no specific personal jurisdiction because out-of-state injuries to out-of-state plaintiffs are not “related to” a defendant’s Missouri activities.  There is no “consent” merely by registering to do business.

But as good as it was, NSRC was not a mass tort case.  Rather, it was an individual litigation tourist plaintiff suing a single non-resident corporation.  NSRC thus had no occasion to address either the 99-plaintiff misjoined tort complaints that have become the bane of Missouri product liability practice or the 99-defendant complaints that are typical of asbestos (and some other) product liability litigation.  Eliminating those abuses are at the core of H.B. 460, meaning that the reforms proposed in H.B. 460 remain every bit as necessary as before.  As we discussed, the court of appeals in Barron v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., ___ S.W.3d ___, 2016 WL 6596091, at *13 (Mo. App. Nov. 8, 2016), invited the legislature to correct the venue/joinder rules, and that is exactly what H.B. 460 will do.


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