We reported on the Northern District of California’s order granting summary judgment in Messick v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp. when it came out in February 2013, and a good and proper order it was. The plaintiff was treated with bisphosphonate therapy for approximately two years, and she alleged that she developed osteonecrosis of the jaw (“ONJ”) more than a year after she stopped the therapy. The problem for the plaintiff was that she had no reliable scientific evidence linking her drug
therapy to her alleged disease. Sure, she had an expert, but the expert admitted that pathology results upon which he relied were not scientifically reliable. He also admitted that his “differential diagnosis” failed to take into account numerous other risk factors, asserting that “it just doesn’t happen” that someone like the plaintiff would experience ONJ without contribution from bisphosphonates.
“It just doesn’t happen” is what we say when discussing whether the Chicago Cubs will win the World Series or whether we will ever fully appreciate the talents of Miley Cyrus. When it comes to giving causation opinions to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, you will forgive us for expecting more. The district court expected more too, and it found the opinion lacking in reliable methodology and also relevancy because the expert could not say that bisphosphonate exposure caused the plaintiff’s ONJ.
You can imagine then our disappointment with the Ninth Circuit’s recent opinion reversing the district court’s sound and well-reasoned order. Messick v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., No. 13-15433, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 6257 (9th Cir. Apr. 4, 2014). The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by stating that “[t]he relevancy bar is low,” and it faulted the district court for excluding the opinion because, even though the expert could not say that the plaintiff’s ONJ was caused by bisphosphonate therapy, he did say that the ONJ was related to bisphosphonate therapy. Id. at **6-7.Continue Reading The Ninth Circuit Taketh Away on Rule 702