We know that any federal court analysis that starts with Although the state has not recognized the duty . . . is going to be followed by a “prediction” of state law that instead creates unprecedented liability according to the federal court’s personal predilections. Which is precisely what the court did in CLF v. Coopersurgical
Today’s guest post is from Reed Smith’s Matt Jacobson. He addresses the latest and greatest result from litigation that has been generating favorable decisions nationwide applying various states’ so-called “blood shield” statutes (practically every state has one) that declare the use of human cells or tissue in medical treatment to be services rather than products, which has the effect of limiting liability to negligence. As always our guest posters deserve 100% of the credit (and any blame) for their work.
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Milovich v. Aziyo Biologics, Inc., No. 1:24-cv-01208-CL, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50935 (D. Or. Feb. 24, 2025), involves Oregon’s human blood and tissue shield statute. The Drug & Device Law Blog has written about similar cases before, but this one might be the best. Blood shield laws have been around for over 60 years. They sound like something that Dracula should fear, along with a knife through the heart, the sun, holy objects, and garlic. But they are not something that should scare anyone who manufactures blood or tissue based products. While states have different statutory language, the gist of blood shield laws is that blood transfusions and transplants are a service and not a sale (Dracula would agree he is performing a service), thus barring claims for breach of warranty and strict liability.Continue Reading Guest Post – The Sun Is Not Setting on Oregon’s Blood Shield Statute
We have frequently reported on plaintiffs’ efforts to salvage untimely claims in the Taxotere MDL. See, for example, here, here, and here. As we explained here, the basic problem for many plaintiffs—who claim that the chemotherapy drug Taxotere caused them permanent hair loss—is how the MDL master complaint defines the plaintiffs’
If you have a good memory, the title of today’s post may seem familiar. That’s because about sixteen months ago, we told you about the appellate court decision in Oregon that reached this conclusion. Now it is official. The Oregon Supreme Court has weighed in and agrees that under Oregon’s product liability statute, hospitals are
Local counsel in one of our cases made it clear that unless we wanted to broadcast that we were from out of state, we needed to pronounce Oregon as “Or-gun” not “Or-ah-gone”, and we have tried to remember that tip ever since. But today’s District of Oregon case, Glover v. Avanos Med., Inc., No.
Listen to your gut. Follow your instincts. Trust your intuition. Great advice in many situations. Like deciding whether to buy skinny jeans or whether to buy your forever home. Or, when things seem “off” or feel “dangerous.” Or, when your body is trying to tell you something about your health. These are all times to
You’ve no doubt heard of the 5 W’s (who, what, where, when, why) as applied in journalism or police investigations. They also apply to litigation. For example, personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens are “where” issues, statute of limitations and statute of repose are “when“ issues, and the metaphysical doubt we defense hacks experience while laboring under the skeptical eyes of pro-plaintiff judges and the vast indifference of the skies is a big – perhaps the biggest – “why” question.
There are also “who” questions, such as whether the plaintiff has standing or whether the right entities are being sued. That last issue crops up all the time, including when plaintiffs pursue parent or innovator companies, pharmacies, sales reps, distributors, etc.
In Brown v. GlaxoSmithKline, LLC, 323 Or. App. 214 (Oregon Ct. of App. Dec. 14, 2022), the issue was whether a hospital that charged for a pharmaceutical drug administered to a patient in its emergency department was a “seller” engaged in the business of selling the drug subject to strict product liability under Oregon’s product liability statute. The trial court granted the hospital’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the hospital was not “in the business of selling” the drug. The plaintiff appealed, got the appellate court to overturn the summary judgment, and kept the hospital in the case.Continue Reading A Hospital Can be a Product Liability Seller-Defendant in Oregon
For the first time in two years, we write from the confines of our office in downtown Philadelphia. While we loved the full-time “work from home” regime, we have fondly re-embraced the near-forgotten view from our 30th-floor window, along with our Dancing Barney doll, our RBG action figure, and our solar-powered effigy of
California is called the land of fruits and nuts, but the Harry and David Company – esteemed purveyor of fruits, nuts, and other delicacies – calls Oregon its home. Oregon gave us Tonya Harding and Ndamukong Suh. Oregon is also the only state besides New Jersey that forbids motorists from pumping their own gas.
We
We’ve seen Griffith v. Blatt, 51 P.3d 1256 (Or. 2002), cited – and not just by plaintiffs – for broad propositions, like Oregon abolished the learned intermediary rule in strict liability cases, or that strict liability, generally, is strait-jacketed by legislative adoption of Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A (1965) and its comments.
We don’t