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After nearly three years of litigation winding through California’s appellate courts, the closely watched Gilead Tenofovir Cases is finally set for oral argument before the California Supreme Court on Wednesday, May 6, 2026, at 9:00 a.m. in San Francisco. The case presents a question with potentially sweeping consequences for product liability law: Does a pharmaceutical manufacturer owe a duty of reasonable care to users of a non-defective medicine when making decisions about the development of an allegedly safer and equally effective alternative compound? Based on long-standing and well-grounded principles of tort law, the correct answer is that no such duty exists or should exist.

Of course, our view on this controversy is well known, having covered the case here, here, here, and here.  For the upcoming oral argument in the California Supreme Court, here is what you need to know. 

The dispute centers on Gilead Sciences and its development of live-saving and life-extending HIV antiretroviral medicines. The plaintiffs are patients who used medicines containing tenofovir disoproxil fumarate (“TDF”) and allegedly experienced warned-of side effects. A positive HIV test was once considered a death sentence, but TDF-based medicines, which the FDA first approved in 2001, changed that and have been credited with saving countless lives.

Most importantly, the plaintiffs do not allege that the TDF medicines they used were defective in design, manufacture, or labeling. That’s right, no alleged product defect.

Instead, the plaintiffs claim that the manufacturer was too slow in developing a different compound, tenofovir alafenamide (“TAF”), which they allege has a better safety profile. The FDA approved TAF-based products in 2015, but in the plaintiffs’ telling, the purported delay in developing these alternative therapies was unreasonable. Of course, in reality there was no “delay” at all, but merely a manufacturer’s decision to dedicate limited development resources to a product that ended up saving thousands of lives. Product manufacturers make product development decisions like these almost every day.

The trial court denied summary judgment on negligence, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed in an opinion that came in as our worst drug or medical device case of 2024. In a first-of-its-kind opinion, the Court of Appeal ruled that a pharmaceutical manufacturer has a duty of reasonable care when it has invented “what it knows is a safer, and at least equally effective, alternative to a prescription drug that it is currently selling and that is not shown to be defective.” Gilead Tenofovir Cases, 98 Cal.App.5th 911, 922 (2024).

The Court of Appeal basically purported to create a new tort—a claim sort of like negligence, but requiring “knowledge,” and custom designed to allow judges and juries to second guess isolated product development decisions, sometimes decades after the fact. This is all in the absence of any allegation of any product defect, let alone proof. Worse yet, the court drew an analogy to Mexicali Rose v. Superior Court, where the California Supreme Court held that a restaurant could be liable in negligence for a chicken bone found in an enchilada. Development of prescription medicines is not like cooking chicken enchiladas.

So here we are. The California Supreme Court granted the manufacturer’s petition for review, and oral argument is set for Wednesday, May 6, 2026, at 9:00 Pacific. The argument will be heard in the Supreme Court’s courtroom in San Francisco, with live-streaming available on the Supreme Court’s website. (Viewing California Supreme Court arguments can be a bit wonky, but if you scroll down to the Oral Arguments section and click through, you should be okay.)

Several critical issues are likely to dominate the argument. First, the Court will confront the threshold question of whether a negligence claim against a product manufacturer can proceed in the absence of any allegation that the product was defective. This question implicates the relationship between strict product liability and negligence, which have traditionally shared a common requirement of proving a product defect. That requirement goes back to the earliest days of product liability law in California and elsewhere.

Second, the Court will likely probe the boundaries of any duty it might recognize. The Court of Appeal attempted to characterize its holding as “narrow,” but we don’t buy it. The Court of Appeal’s attempt to define the purported duty was tortured at best, and the potential for confusion and slippery expansion clearly exists.

Third, public policy implications are obvious. In Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049 (1988), the California Supreme Court rejected strict product liability for prescription drugs in part because public policy favors the development and marketing of beneficial new drugs. The Court of Appeal’s new duty directly undermines this precedent. Moreover, the Court of Appeal’s new duty potentially impacts not only pharmaceutical manufacturers, but also manufacturers in other industries driven by innovation. The International Center for Law & Economics argued in its amicus brief that the Court of Appeal’s rule effectively “imposes unlimited liability” by eliminating the defect requirement that has long served as a cornerstone of product liability law.

If the California Supreme Court affirms the Court of Appeal, it will establish a new theory of manufacturer liability that has no precedent in any American jurisdiction. If the Court reverses, it will reaffirm the centrality of the defect requirement to product liability law and retain potential negligence liability within well-established limits.

All eyes will be on San Francisco on May 6.

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Bexis recently attended the Spring Conference of the Product Liability Advisory Council (“PLAC”).  PLAC meetings are usually good for new blogpost ideas, and this one was no exception.  Today’s idea comes from an unusual source, though – the final day’s ethics presentation.  That presentation was about artificial intelligence, mostly in the mass tort context.  One segment pointed out how the other side is using AI for, among other things, new plaintiff intake.  That prompted us to take a look at who’s advertising what to the other side.  We don’t particularly want to promote their business, but an on-line journal article we found stated:

AI tools can be used in mass tort management to streamline case intake by automating data collection from online forms, emails, and calls.  It can drastically reduce manual entry errors and time.  They analyze plaintiff information in real-time to assess eligibility and match individuals to appropriate tort categories.

We didn’t have to look far.  An ad masquerading as a blog promised that it “excels in lead screening” and could “pre-qualify callers by asking about drug usage, medical diagnoses, and side effects.” Another article promised “intake” that would “engage every caller, capture and analyze every detail, and prioritize the highest-value cases.”  We found advertisements pushing prospective plaintiff “identification and enrichment” that promised to create MDL-specific matrices and to populate them with “scored” data that included familiar information:  product use, qualifying injury, and statute of limitations.  Another promoted “AI-based automated intake forms” that could “restore client information and verify it with official databases at the same time as it detects missing documentation.”  Still another was offering AI “fillable PDFs” with “tools to help structure the data such as checkboxes and drop-down lists.”  These would collect information about would-be plaintiffs’ “general demographics,” “medical background,” “proof of use or exposure,” and “proof of the injury being alleged.”  We didn’t have to dig past the second page of Google results.

Maybe these plaintiff AI tools are as good as advertised, maybe not.  But the fundamental problem remains – mass tort incentives have never (at least prior to settlement) favored careful early vetting of plaintiffs.  Instead, the other side’s modus operandi has always been “the more, the merrier.”  They get names and file claims, and then they leave it to the defense to spend the time and effort to separate the good claims (if any) from those that would never have been filed in one-off litigation.  We have serious doubts that even the most efficient AI changes those incentives much.

However, plaintiffs’ use of AI plaintiff intake tools provides the defense an opportunity to put new Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.1 to work.  Specifically, Rule 16.1(b) requires (unless an MDL court prohibits it) that the parties address “how and when” they “will exchange information about the factual bases for their claims” (emphasis original).  Note use of “will” rather than “whether” in this section.  That means it’s mandatory (unlike most of the rest of Rule 16.1).  We should seek to obtain the factual (not privileged) plaintiff “information” that their AI has collected.  If these systems work as well as advertised, that should be easy for the other side to produce, and maybe the cost of vetting the bodies they dig up can be more equitably apportioned in MDLs.

But that’s not all.  Equally important, is what “information” we might still have to collect because plaintiffs failed to utilize all the advertised bells and whistles that these AI systems claim to possess.  We’re not talking about particular AI prompts − especially anything that may be subject to work product privilege.  What we are suggesting is determining whether the other side is affirmatively disabling their own AI systems so they can continue to file factually unsupported lawsuits.  That would seem to be a rather blatant violation of Rule 11, and we hope the other side does not do this.  However, their track record on vetting their own supposed clients is not very good.

Our side’s Rule 16.1(b) statements thus should make an effort to ensure that the other side is actually using the early vetting capacity of their own AI programs.  Given the “file and forget” incentives that the plaintiffs’ side has in mass torts, it would not surprise us at all that some plaintiff firms do not use much of the informational functionality of their own AI.  Knowing that would be useful, both in determining potential apportionment of discovery expenses for information plaintiffs could have collected, but did not, and more generally to call the other side’s credibility into question early in the MDL process.

So that is our take home idea from PLAC.  Since the other side claims to be using sophisticated AI tools in mass tort plaintiff intake – we should ensure that they are actually using their available AI capacity to do what Rule 11(b)(3) supposedly required them to be doing all along:  pre-complaint verification that their client’s “factual contentions have evidentiary support.”

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No, not that case.  The appeal of the FIFRA preemption rulings in glyphosate litigation is still pending.  This decision is Hencely v. Fluor Corp., No. 24-924, 2026 U.S. Lexis 1868 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2026), which involves the preemption of negligence claims against a military contractor in connection with a terrorist attack on the Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan.  In some ways, the Hencely case is worlds away from product liability claims related to medical products.  In other ways, it is close enough for this Blog to pay attention, especially if you go back to some of the factual details from the Fourth Circuit decision that the majority Supreme Court decision omitted.  We will presume to explain, although with some hardy initial disclaimers.  First, the underlying events in Hencely are tragic.  Our post should not be read to minimize those events or draw any connections to current U.S. military activities.  Second, although the Blog has addressed the government contractor defense in connection with product liability claims, we are not experts in government contracts or national defense law.  We leave for others the discussion of whether Hencely will have a chilling effect on the availability of contractors to fill roles in connection with Department of Defense or other national security functions, an issue the dissent raised.  Id. at 36.  Third, the alignment of the Court—Justice Thomas writing for a majority that included Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Jackson, Gorsuch, and Barrett and Justice Alito writing a dissent in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh joined—could invite a vigorous discussion about inconsistent positions being taken compared to some of the big prior decisions we discussed on preemption and other subjects, such as here, here, here, and here.  Suffice it to say that the five male members of the Court tend to be on the same side in terms of federalism, originalism, and stare decisis.  Not in Hencely.

From the title and preceding paragraph, the outcome of Hencely should be clear:  The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment based on preemption and Fourth Circuit’s affirmance.  Plaintiff sued a defense contractor and its subsidiaries over injuries he sustained at Bagram in 2016 while an active duty Army member in connection with a suicide bombing he tried to stop.  Tragically, this was one of several attacks on the base over time, including by infiltrators.  The terrorist who caused the injuries in Hencely got on base through a U.S. military policy called “Afghan First,” although he was employed by the defendant contractor and under its supervision.  The U.S. military also supervised and screened the terrorist leading up to the attack, according to the Fourth Circuit and the dissent but not mentioned in the majority opinion.  Plaintiff brought his suit in the District of South Carolina and asserted negligence claims under South Carolina law.  Although the U.S. was not sued—presumably because of sovereign immunity—even without details from the complaint, we can say that it would have been fairly obvious from the start that this case would have to involve evidence about policies, actions, and decisions of the U.S. military.  That realization, in turn, should have raised major constitutional concerns, because states lack authority to weigh in on how the U.S. military operates a base in Afghanistan.  Somehow, Hencely got past the pleading stage before the defendant won summary judgment.  554 F. Supp. 3d 770 (D.S.C. 2021).  The Fourth Circuit affirmed in a long and detailed opinion.  120 F. 4th 412 (4th Cir. 2024).  [For some reason, both the majority opinion and dissent in Hencely are littered with citation errors, which we will attempt not to repeat.]

We can cut to the chase and say that the Fourth Circuit and dissent made more sense and appeared to consider more of the record than the selective recounting in the majority decision.  Rather than go through the details of how the dueling opinions got to their respective conclusions, we want to focus on some of the language used and some of the omissions compared to the preemption analyses we usually see in drug and device cases. 

First, the Bexis bugaboo, the purported presumption against preemption.  There is no discussion of this concept in the majority decision or the Fourth Circuit’s decision.  The dissent has a discussion of how a presumption applies to field preemption in an area traditionally occupied by states but not to areas that the constitution or congress specified as federal.  Id. at *27.  Frankly, the majority could have referred to such a presumption as part of its rationale, but the omission may only matter to us.

Second, while we use the term “field preemption,” the majority and dissent in Hencely do not.  The majority uses the term “battlefield preemption” once when referring to the basis for the Fourth Circuit’s affirmance.  Id. at *9.  Five circuits, including the Fourth, have adopted that doctrine, and most press about Hencely has referred to that as the issue being decided, but the dissent never uses the term as it rebuts the majority’s rejection of it.  (The majority also does not give a tally of which circuits have or have not adopted the doctrine.)  The terms “express preemption” and “implied preemption” appear once each, both in the dissent in characterizing holdings in other cases.  No mentions of “conflict preemption” or “obstacle preemption” can be found.  This differs from our experience, which has typically involved analyzing which particular species of preemption applies to the asserted claims.  Of field, express, and implied, the last has a few subspecies.  Such labeling may be less important to this Court.  For instance, the distillation of the reasoning of the dissent’s position is decidedly unlabeled:

In sum, we have long recognized that the Constitution itself may demand preemption when a state law intrudes upon an area of exclusive federal authority. And because the Constitution gives the Federal Government exclusive authority over foreign affairs and the conduct of wars, federal law preempts all state law that substantially interferes with the Government’s exercise of those powers.

Id. at *28.

Third, the only discussions of a legal “defense” were in connection with the government contractor defense, which was not at issue on appeal, and a possible defense to punitive damages, which was not at issue on appeal.  The burden in connection with the motion below was not discussed.  The standards for summary judgment and the appellate review of a summary judgment decision are absent.  Whether the evidence in the record below left any genuine dispute as to material facts was not addressed, even to acknowledge any conflicting evidence.  The only mention of evidence was in the dissent in the context of pointing out that scrutiny of the U.S. military’s decisions and actions would be inevitable if the case went to trial.  This is also strange to us.  If anything, we might infer that the majority reached its decision based on the idea that it would be unfair to deprive plaintiff of a chance at recovery.  Similarly, we could offer that the dissent was driven by concerns about the imposition on the military of a case that second-guessed its policies and actions.  If we are right about the majority’s motivations, then that is not a great sign for medical product manufacturers up against sympathetic plaintiffs.

Fourth, in addition to the expected range of amici on each side, the United States submitted a brief in support of the defendant.  The Solicitor General was also permitted to participate in the oral argument.  It makes sense that the U.S. would favor preemption in a case where the military would otherwise be subject to burdensome and tricky discovery and be the subject of extensive second-guessing at trial.  Similar logic would suggest that the U.S. would support preemption in cases that fundamentally second guess the decisions of FDA, including its regulations.  Yet, U.S. amicus support in those cases has not been consistent.  In Hencely, the position of the U.S. did not sway the majority.  To the contrary, the report of the military finding fault with the contractor in connection with the terrorist attack featured much more prominently.  In contrast to the dissent, the majority largely ignored that the Afghan First program and the security requirements the military imposed would be major focuses in the case—which clearly supports preemption.  This reminds us of how some courts that allow preempted claims and evidence tend to focus on theoretical ways that the manufacturer could have acted differently while turning a blind eye to how plaintiffs hinge their case on the alleged inadequacies of the FDCA, FDA regulations, and FDA actions.  The Supreme Court should be more savvy about such things.

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Today’s guest post is another tech-related discussion from Reed Smith‘s Jamie Lanphear. Given the increasing ubiquity of artificial intelligence (“AI”) in legal practice, the notion of AI prompts and output becoming yet another front in the never-ending ediscovery wars is concerning. Here are Jamie’s latest thoughts on the latest pertinent caselaw in this area. As always our guest posters deserve 100% of the credit (and any blame) for their efforts.

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The Blog has recently covered both the discoverability of AI prompts (here) and the Heppner decision out of the Southern District of New York (here). Since those posts, courts have continued to develop the law in this area — and some of the developments are encouraging. This post picks up where those earlier discussions left off, surveying the latest case law on privilege, work product, and waiver as they apply to AI prompts and outputs, and offering practical guidance for lawyers and in-house teams navigating an area where the rules are still being written.

Heppner: A Quick Recap and What It Leaves Open

As the Blog discussed here, in United States v. Heppner, 2026 WL 436479 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2026), Judge Rakoff held that a criminal defendant’s communications with a generative AI platform were protected by neither attorney-client privilege nor the work product doctrine. The holding rested on several narrow facts: the defendant used a public AI tool on his own, without direction from counsel; the platform’s terms of service destroyed any expectation of confidentiality; and the materials were seized pursuant to a search warrant in a criminal case rather than sought through civil discovery. The court did not apply or analyze work product protection under Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The decision generated significant concern – but the limited application left a number of important questions unanswered.

Open Questions: Privilege in the Corporate AI Context

Heppner is what we have on privilege, but it does not tell us very much about how privilege will apply in the corporate context. The case involved a party acting on his own, not for the purpose of seeking legal advice from counsel. The in-house world presents meaningfully different scenarios.

Start with the threshold problem. Attorney-client privilege requires a communication between an attorney and a client, and when a corporate employee communicates with an AI chatbot, the communication is between the employee and a machine — not between the employee and counsel.

However, there are more-than plausible arguments that some of these interactions should remain protected. If an attorney directs an employee to use an in-house AI tool as part of the process of providing legal advice, the tool looks more like an agent than a third party — functionally similar to a paralegal or other intermediary acting at counsel’s direction. No court has endorsed that theory yet, but it is not an unreasonable application of existing doctrine to novel facts. Thus, in the first place, attorneys should think long and hard before directing clients (rather than their own offices) to do something like this.

The same logic applies in more routine scenarios. If an employee communicates with a colleague to gather information at counsel’s request for the purpose of providing legal advice to the company, those communications are privileged. What if the employee consults an AI tool instead of a colleague? The substance of the interaction is the same — the employee is gathering information counsel needs to provide legal advice. The only difference is the medium.

A related question arises with enterprise AI tools. If a company deploys an internal AI system and counsel interacts with that system to obtain information necessary to provide legal advice, there is a reasonable argument that the tool functions as the client’s agent. That scenario is not meaningfully different from an attorney communicating with a client’s accountant or other third-party agent to obtain information needed to render legal advice. Enterprise tools are deployed by the company, access-controlled, and integrated into the legal workflow. They are not consumer-grade chatbots with permissive terms of service. That factual distinction was critical to the outcome in Heppner.

None of these theories has been tested. But it is unlikely that courts will fail to find ways to adapt privilege doctrine to accommodate the realities of AI use. The law may lag science, but it does not ignore technology. The analogies are there, and courts have adapted privilege to new contexts before. The questions are not whether privilege will evolve, but how, and with what nuances.

Morgan: A Counter to Heppner

A recent decision out of the District of Colorado offers a notably different perspective on whether AI interactions are protected — at least under the work product doctrine. In Morgan v. V2X, Inc., No. 25-cv-01991-SKC-MDB, 2026 WL 864223 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2026), an employment discrimination case, a pro se plaintiff used AI in connection with litigation preparation. The defendant moved to compel disclosure of the AI tool the plaintiff was using and sought to amend the protective order to restrict AI use with confidential information. The discoverability of the plaintiff’s actual prompts and outputs was not directly at issue, but in working through the questions before it, the court engaged in an analysis that pushes back on several of the premises underlying Heppner—and the result is some useful support for the proposition that AI-assisted litigation materials are protected work product.

First, the court held that Rule 26(b)(3) broadly protects materials prepared in anticipation of litigation by a party, not merely by counsel. In civil cases, the rule’s plain language extends work product protection to parties and their representatives—a point that distinguished Morgan from Heppner, which was a criminal case governed by a different procedural rule.

Second, the court rejected the argument that using a third-party platform destroys confidentiality or waives protection. Drawing on Fourth Amendment case law, the court made a point that is both memorable and important: does anyone with a Gmail account forfeit all rights to confidentiality because Gmail has access to their emails? The court emphasized that in today’s world, nearly all electronic interactions pass through third-party systems, and courts are increasingly pushing back on the notion that using modern technology automatically destroys privilege.

Third, the court emphasized that work product (in contrast to attorney/client privilege) waiver requires disclosure to an adversary or under circumstances that substantially increase the likelihood that an adversary would obtain the information. Disclosure to an AI platform provider does not meet this standard—you are not disclosing information to your adversary, and there is no meaningful indication the information will end up in an adversary’s hands simply because it was entered into an AI system.

An important caveat: because the pro se litigant in Morgan was simultaneously the party and the advocate, Morgan does not resolve what happens when a non-attorney party — say, a corporate employee — uses AI independently, without attorney direction. In that scenario, the Heppner “gap” between party and counsel would exist even in the civil context. But the textual foundation of Rule 26(b)(3), as the Morgan court discussed it, supports an argument that such use would still be protected.

The bottom line is that while Morgan did not directly rule on the discoverability of prompts and outputs, it supports the position that AI-assisted litigation materials can fall within work product — and that the mere fact that information is processed or stored by an AI platform does not automatically result in waiver. This is a practical and sensible position that hopefully other courts will follow.

Tremblay: Prompts and Outputs as Opinion Work Product

As the Blog has noted (here), Tremblay v. OpenAI Inc., No. 23-cv-03223-AMO, 2024 WL 3748003 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2024), established that when counsel crafts AI prompts, both the prompts and the resulting outputs constitute opinion work product — the highest tier of protection — because the prompts reflect counsel’s mental impressions and opinions about how to interrogate the AI tool. Opinion work product is virtually undiscoverable absent a showing that counsel’s mental impressions are at issue and the need for the material is compelling.

This means that, at least until the case law further develops, having counsel create or direct the creation of AI prompts is not just a best practice. It has doctrinal consequences for the level of protection those materials receive. As a general principle, the closer an attorney is to the creation of the prompts, the stronger the argument that the materials are protected work product.

Waiver: Where Protection Breaks Down

Work product protection can be lost, and several recent decisions illustrate how that can happen in the context of AI use.

In Concord Music Group, Inc. v. Anthropic PBC, the court addressed waiver across multiple discovery orders over the course of 2025. See, e.g., 2025 WL 1482734 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2025); 2025 WL 3677935 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). Consistent with Tremblay, the court held that the prompts and related settings used in the publishers’ investigations were opinion work product. The publishers voluntarily produced the prompts and outputs they relied on in their complaint and filings — roughly 5,000 prompt-output pairs. The defendant then sought broadly all of the remaining prompts and outputs, including those that did not support the publishers’ claims. The court denied that request as overbroad, holding that waiver must be closely tailored to the needs of the opposing party and limited to what is necessary to rectify any unfair advantage gained.

Later in the litigation, the publishers conducted an investigation into the effectiveness of the defendant’s AI guardrails — essentially testing whether the guardrails could be circumvented using various prompts. When they indicated they intended to put a witness on the stand to testify about that investigation — including the prompts the witness used and what he learned using them — the court found at-issue waiver under the sword-and-shield doctrine. In deciding where the draw the line, the court held that protection had been waived for the prompts that had been provided to the witness to conduct the investigation—including those provided to him by counsel—and the associated outputs, but those that remained with the attorney (and therefore were not placed at issue) remained protected. So here we see waiver of opinion work product, but a narrow tailoring of that waiver by the court.

A similar result played out in T.B. v. Big Brothers Big Sisters of N.Y.C., No. 452864/2021, 2025 WL 2443502 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 21, 2025), where plaintiff’s counsel disclosed a portion of a ChatGPT transcript during a deposition. The court held that this placed the summary at issue and waived work product protection, and ordered production of the full AI exchange.

While these waiver principles are not new (or unique to AI), what AI potentially changes is the frequency with which the issue might arise. Tools that make it easy to generate analytical work product—evaluating complaint data, synthesizing the medical literature, identifying patterns in adverse event reports—also make it easy to rely on that work product in ways that place it at issue. The discipline and forethought are the same that have always been required. AI may just create more opportunities to get it wrong.

Where This Is Headed

As Judge Rakoff observed, AI “presents a new frontier in the ongoing dialogue between technology and the law.” That much is obvious. What is increasingly clear from the case law, however, is that courts are finding ways to apply existing doctrines to new technology. Work product protection extends to AI interactions. Attorney-crafted prompts are opinion work product and therefore receive the highest level of protection. And the mere use of a third-party AI platform does not automatically waive that protection.

The attorney/client privilege question is less settled, but the analogies are there. And there is no reason to think that courts will not adapt privilege doctrine to accommodate AI—just as they have adapted it to accommodate other evolutions in the provision of legal services. The waiver landscape requires attention, but the principles exist and the framework for applying them is well established. What remains is for courts to work through the application in this particular context.

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This post is from the non-Reed Smith side of the blog.

If you’re going to forum shop, you still need a legitimate forum. That was the problem for plaintiffs in Rodriguez v. Thoratec Corp., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88964 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2026). Texas and Arkansas residents brought suit in California over an implanted medical device—even though the device was implanted in Texas, all treatment occurred in Texas, and the decedent died in Texas. The only apparent hook? One defendant’s alleged citizenship in California. That wasn’t enough. The court granted defendants’ motion to transfer to the Northern District of Texas.

The case involves a left ventricular assist device (LVAD) implanted in Texas. Following the recipient’s death, his family sued, alleging device-related complications. But there was no dispute about where the relevant events occurred: implantation, treatment, and death all took place in Texas.

Before turning to convenience—the question of whether the case should be transferred–the court first confirmed that the case could have been brought in Texas. It could. The manufacturer was subject to specific personal jurisdiction there because it sold the device in Texas, and plaintiffs’ claims “arise out of and relate to” those contacts. Any potential jurisdictional gaps as to other defendants disappeared when they consented to personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of Texas “for the limited purposes of the case.” Id. at *6-10. Diversity jurisdiction supplied subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at *10-12. And since it was undisputed that a “substantial part of the events … giving rise to the claim occurred” in Texas, venue is proper there.  Id. at *13.

That cleared the way for the familiar eight-factor transfer analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). And nearly every factor pointed in the same direction–east.

Plaintiffs’ choice of forum? While ordinarily a heavy weight on the scale, here it was entitled to little deference because plaintiffs were not California residents. Id. at *13-14. Moreover, California had no meaningful connection to the operative facts. None. So, plaintiffs’ choice did not weigh against transfer. 

Convenience of the parties? Also Texas. Plaintiffs lived in Texas and its neighbor Arkansas. Defendants undercut plaintiffs’ only counter—concerns about securing company witnesses live at trial—by agreeing to produce appropriate witnesses in Texas.  Id. at *14-15. Another factor for transfer.

Convenience of the witnesses? This one is often “the most important factor” considered by courts, nd the primary concern is third-party witnesses. Here, that was decisive.  The key third-party witnesses—the implanting surgeon and treating physicians—were in Texas. To the exten it mattered, defendants’ concession addressed their own employees. Id. at *15-16. Transfer again.

Ease of access to evidence? Plaintiffs tried the old “documents are in California” argument. The court wasn’t buying it. In the age of electronic storage, the physical location of the PMA file means little. Id. at *16-17. Neutral.

Familiarity with the law? Texas law likely governs a Texas-based injury, and a Texas federal court is better positioned to apply it. Id. at *17. Transfer.

Local interest? Strong in Texas, where the device was used and the alleged injury occurred. California’s interest in regulating manufacturers within their borders exists but is “decidedly weaker” when the injury happens elsewhere. Id. at *18. Transfer.

Court congestion? This is just about reading the federal court statistics. The Northern District of Texas was less congested. Id. at *18-19. Transfer.

At the end of the day, this was not a close call. When the plaintiffs, the medical care, the alleged injury, and the key witnesses are all in Texas, filing in California looks less like a reasoned choice and more like a detour. Section 1404(a) exists to correct exactly that. Courts do not need to indulge choices with no meaningful connection to the dispute.

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Our PMA Preemption Scorecard now collects 729 opinions, the vast majority of which find preemption (which is why it’s a “scorecard”).  Only three of them are from the Land of Enchantment, New Mexico – with two of them being in the same case.  The third is Yusnukis v. Nevro Corp., 2026 WL 509227 (D.N.M. Feb. 24, 2026).  The complaint alleged manufacturing and warning (not design) defects, breach of express and implied warranties, a negligence claim resembling negligence per se, fraud and consumer fraud violations.  Par for the course in 2026, we’d say.

But the product was a PMA-approved spinal cord stimulator, so the entire kit and kaboodle was dismissed, largely on preemption grounds.  Also par for the course, given the many preemptive FDA requirements to which PMA devices are subject plus the FDCA’s prohibition against private enforcement/causes of action. “Where a plaintiff misses this narrow gap, the claim is preempted and subject to dismissal.” Id. at *3 (citation omitted).

The preemption discussion starts, as many do, with judicial notice of both the device’s PMA and subsequent supplemental PMAs.  Id. at *4.  Plaintiffs often try to ward off preemption, at least on the pleadings, by not alleging anything about the device’s FDA pedigree.  Thankfully, Yusnukis, like most courts, didn’t let them.  The decision also noticed the fact, but not the truth, of the device’s warnings.  Id.

As is apparent from our PMA Preemption Scorecard, the only typical product liability claim the ever gets much purchase in PMA preemption cases are allegations of manufacturing defect.  Not in Yusnukis.  Plaintiff claimed that the device’s “leads deviated from FDA-approved specifications by exhibiting impedance values greater than 18 Ohms.”  Id. (footnote omitted).  Seemingly out of nowhere pops something called a “connect module,” which plaintiff claimed the defendant “failed to disclose.”  That claim was wrecked on the implied preemption side of the “narrow gap.”  “[C]laims premised on nondisclosure or misrepresentation to the FDA are ‘fraud-on-the-FDA’ claims, which the Supreme Court has held are impliedly preempted,” because “[e]nforcement of FDCA compliance rests solely with the federal government, not private litigants.”  Id. at *6 (citation to you-know-what omitted).

Then plaintiff argued that the manufacturing claim was a “parallel” claim.  It was not, because the 18 Ohms allegation did not correspond to anything in the PMA.

[E]ven accepting Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, the [complaint] does not plausibly allege:  what FDA-approved specification required impedance at or below 18 Ohms, [or] how Plaintiff’s device departed from that specification beyond a conclusory reference to impedance readings.

Id.  The purported manufacturing defect thus nowhere alleged any “deviation” from any FDA requirement – let alone causation.  Id.  No deviation = no parallel claim = express preemption.

Next to go were the implied warranty claims.  “Courts consistently hold that implied warranty claims on dangerousness or ineffectiveness are preempted because they would require altering a PMA-approved design or labeling contrary to federal law.“ Id. at *7 (citations omitted).  Yusnukis was no different, as the merchantability claim asserted generally that the device was “unreasonably dangerous” and “not fit for its ordinary purpose.”  Id.  And once again, the complaint “do[es] not identify any FDA-approved specification requiring impedance below 18 Ohms.”  Buh-bye.  For some reason the plaintiff also alleged breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.  Another “par for the course” dismissal:  “The [complaint] does not allege that [defendant] knew of any particular purpose beyond the device’s ordinary indication.”  Id. at *8.  Nor did plaintiff plead reliance.  Id. at *9.  Go away, without even having to reach preemption.

Failure to warn also failed to work.  True, the warnings did not include the specifics of plaintiff’s alleged injuries, but that’s not a defense to express preemption (“different from or in addition to”).  Id. 

Plaintiff has not identified any FDA requirement mandating warnings about [plaintiff’s claimed injuries]. The FDA-approved labeling for [the] device contains warnings about [various other risks] . . . but it does not include the risks Plaintiff alleges. . . .  Plaintiff thus seeks to impose duties “different from, or in addition to” federal requirements, and the claim is expressly preempted under §360k(a).  Allowing such a claim to proceed would invite precisely the kind of state-law interference with FDA labeling determinations that Congress sought to bar, creating obligations that could undermine medical device regulation.

Id. at *10 (following Caplinger v. Medtronic, Inc., 784 F.3d 1335 (10th Cir. 2015) (which we discussed here) (other citations omitted).

Pursuing liability despite the device having the warnings that the FDA approved, plaintiff claimed that those warnings were nonetheless “false or misleading in any particular.”  Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. §352).  No.  That section “govern[s] labeling in a general sense,” but plaintiff’s “state law claims swept far more broadly,” thus “the scope of the plaintiff’s state law claims exceeded the scope of the federal provisions she cited, they were not truly parallel.”  2026 WL 509227, at *10.  “[T]he state-law duty [plaintiff] identifies − to provide adequate warnings of foreseeable risks to a learned intermediary − sweeps more broadly than §352 and would require warnings about risks the FDA did not require.”  Id.  Express preemption precludes any “sweeping state duty to warn of foreseeable risks, without pointing to any specific FDA requirement requiring the warnings [plaintiff] seeks.”  Id.  Yusnukis thus provides a pithy dismissal of a bogus “misbranding“ warning argument that we see far too frequently.

Nor did “negligence” – actually negligence per se without using that phrase – fit through the narrow gap.  Plaintiff alleged a laundry list of compliance procedures that supposedly violated an equally long list of FDA good manufacturing practices.  Id. at *11.  The two lists, however, nowhere explained defect or causation.

Plaintiff fails to connect any specific regulatory violation to his injuries.  Plaintiff recites regulatory provisions and asserts proximate cause, but he offers no factual details showing how any specific violation resulted in . . . the basis of his injuries. Under [TwIqbal], such formulaic recitations are insufficient to state a plausible claim. . . .  [C]onclusory recitations of regulatory duties and proximate cause fail where the complaint does not allege facts connecting any violation to the plaintiff’s injuries.

Id. at 11 (citations omitted).  The claim thus failed on pleading grounds, and the court did not reach preemption.  Id.

The plaintiff in Yusnukis alleged five purportedly material misrepresentations as “fraud.”  Id. at *12.  Four of them failed because they were merely “forward-looking assurances rather than actionable misrepresentations of present fact.”  Id.  The fifth statement was closer to a present fact, but still inadequate, because plaintiff forgot the most basic element of fraud – falsity.  Id. at *13.  Further, none of these allegations pleaded either intent or causation with the necessary particularity.  Id. at *12-13.

Express warranty was also dismissed.  Boilerplate “safety and effectiveness” would-be warranties failed practically every element and were dismissed.  Id. at *14.  Purported “future performance” warranties were also boilerplate:

Plaintiff alleges only that the device was “not reasonably safe,” caused “numerous serious side effects,” resulted in “severe and permanent injury,” and “did not deliver the claimed results.”  These are generalized assertions of product failure, not factual allegations that the device failed to conform to any particular affirmation, promise, or description that formed the basis of the bargain.

Id.

Last and least were plaintiff’s supposed consumer protection claim.  Those allegations were “little more than a barebones recitation of the elements of a [New Mexico consumer protection] claim.”  Id. at *15.  Even worse, by the end of the complaint, plaintiff had given up even pretending to plead facts and instead “relie[d] on incorporation by reference, leaving the Court to piece together the claim.”  Id.  That failed even Rule 8’s ordinary pleading standards.  Id.  “[R]eliance on incorporation by reference and recitation of statutory elements does not cure the absence of factual detail linking a particular representation to the sale of goods.”  Id.

Seven claims up; seven claims down.  Yusnukis is a comprehensive rejection of most of the usual medical device product liability allegations, on both preemption and pleading grounds.  Any defendant litigating a PMA medical device case in New Mexico should be aware of it.

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Early Bird pricing may be history, but the good news is the 2026 Drug and Medical Device Seminar is shaping up to be anything but ordinary. If you like smart people, sharp ideas, and a little Boston energy, you’re in the right place.

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This post is not from the Reed Smith or Dechert sides of the blog.

We previously posted about the Delaware Supreme Court’s ruling that proper application of Delaware Rule 702 required the exclusion of plaintiffs’ general causation experts in the Zantac litigation. Since then, we’ve been waiting for the other shoe to drop.  Last week, it dropped with a resounding boom. Today’s decision applied the Delaware Supreme Court’s ruling and dismissed over 80,000 cases. In re Zantac (Ranitidine) Litig., No. N22C-090101, 2026 WL 1009008 (Del. Super. Apr. 14, 2026).

The decision focuses on the question of which plaintiffs are bound by the exclusion of the plaintiffs’ general causation experts. The court denied plaintiffs leave to supplement their expert reports on December 1, 2025, and the defense argued that all plaintiffs with cases filed before December 1, 2025, are bound by the ruling. Recognizing that the litigation was about to be eviscerated, plaintiffs made a number of desperate arguments.

Continue Reading No Mulligans in Delaware – Exclusion of Plaintiffs’ General Causation Experts Results in Dismissal of 80,000 Zantac Cases
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Can we all agree that as between vaccines and [checks notes] “snort[ing] cocaine off of toilet seats”, it is the vaccines that should make us “not scared of a germ”?

Ok, maybe the [checks notes] Secretary of Health and Human Services wouldn’t agree, but c’mon—the evidence that vaccines save lives is overwhelming. 

As Perry v. Marteney, __ F.4th __, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 10101, 2026 WL 946152 (4th Cir. Apr. 8, 2026) recounts:

  • Smallpox went from killing 10% of London’s population in the 17th century and 500 million people globally between 1880 and 1980 to completely eradicated by 1980 after a global vaccination campaign.
  • Deaths caused by [other diseases] have also been significantly reduced since vaccines were first developed: diphtheria (100%); polio (100%); measles (100%); mumps (100%); rubella (100%); whooping cough (99.3%); tetanus (99.2%); chickenpox (81.9%); and hepatitis B (80.2%).

In fact, one of the amazing things about vaccines is that not only do they provide disease protection for the person vaccinated, they also can provide protection for the people around them, including the medically fragile whose conditions won’t allow them to get vaccines themselves. 

Or at least they can provide “herd immunity” if a large enough percentage of the herd is vaccinated.  Vaccine mandates work well to accomplish that goal, but they get a lot of push-back, including by those with religious objections.

Perry addressed the collision between compulsory vaccination laws and asserted religious rights.  In a divided opinion, the Fourth Circuit reversed a preliminary injunction that had allowed an unvaccinated child to remain enrolled in an online West Virginia public school based on her parents’ religious objections to vaccination.  The majority opinion reaffirms the continuing force of Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), and falls in line with other opinions we have written about as of late. 

Like Jacobson, the Perry majority acknowledges the breadth of state police power when public health is at issue, and the limited role the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause plays where a neutral, generally applicable vaccination mandate is involved.  The dissent, by contrast, reads recent Supreme Court decisions as significantly expanding strict scrutiny protection for parental religious objections in the public-school setting and would have upheld the injunction.

The West Virginia law in question requires children attending “public, private or parochial” schools to be immunized against a list of serious infectious diseases, including chickenpox, hepatitis B, measles, meningitis, mumps, diphtheria, polio, rubella, tetanus, and whooping cough.  W. Va. Code § 16‑3‑4(c).  

All 50 states have some form of compulsory vaccination requirement, but West Virginia is one of the few that provides no religious exemption.  West Virginia’s law only allows for medical exemptions, when “immunization is contraindicated or there exists a specific precaution to a particular vaccine,” as certified by a licensed physician.  W. Va. Code § 16‑3‑4(h)(1).  Even then, West Virginia doesn’t just take the doctor’s note at face value—a state Immunization Officer decides whether there is “sufficient medical evidence” to justify the medical exemption, and that decision is then subject to appeal to the State Health Officer, and judicial review under the state Administrative Procedures Act.

At the same time, West Virginia requires all children to attend school, save for those taught through approved home instruction, “learning pods” or “microschools”.  These children are not subject to the vaccination requirement because they do not attend “schools” within the meaning of the vaccination mandate.

Perry involved a child who was dis-enrolled from a state-run public virtual academy (where the online content delivered by state-certified teachers) because she was not fully vaccinated as the statute required.  After her parents failed to obtain a religious exemption from the vaccine requirement, they sued and won a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the mandate.

The Fourth Circuit then reversed.  It began by situating West Virginia’s law within a long line of cases recognizing broad state authority to enact health measures, including vaccination, starting with Jacobson which had upheld a smallpox vaccine mandate while warning against trying to uphold public health if “each [man] is a law unto himself.”

The long-standing legal test is that a neutral and generally applicable law that incidentally burdens religious practice is subject only to rational-basis review, whereas governmental burdens on religious practice that are not neutral and generally applicable are subject to strict scrutiny.  Notably, Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), used compulsory vaccination as a paradigmatic example of a neutral and generally applicable, legally-required “civic obligation” that could not be made contingent on constitutionally required religious exemption without effectively turning every believer into “a law unto himself.”

Neither side really argued that West Virginia’s vaccination statute was not neutral, as the law neither targets nor disfavors religion on its face or in its operation. 

But as to general applicability, the question was whether the allowance for medical exemptions and the statutory classifications (that it applied to school students but not adult school workers; and it applied to virtual school students but not homeschoolers) made the vaccine mandate not generally applicable. 

The court found it notable that West Virginia officials have no authority to grant ad hoc exceptions for religious or other reasons.  The only exemptions allowed are medical, and those require “sufficient medical evidence” that the immunization is contraindicated or subject to a specific precaution for a particular child.  Moreover, that limited statutory exemption was constrained by appellate review options.  The majority thus fell in line with every other circuit (the First, Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits) to have addressed vaccine mandate medical exemptions, agreeing that they do not undermine the general applicability of a vaccine law

As to the distinctions drawn between populations subject to the mandate, the Fourth Circuit concluded they also did not deprive the mandate of its general applicability.  Differential treatment between secular categories (like between virtual school students and homeschoolers) does not raise the suspicion of religious animus that distinctions between religious and secular conduct would.

With the finding that the law was neutral and generally applicable, the rational basis standard was readily met:  The state’s interest in preventing the spread and severity of serious infectious diseases among schoolchildren was legitimate if not compelling, and compulsory vaccination is crafted to address that concern.  Moreover, the criticisms hurled at the law did not make it irrational.  For example, while both virtual students and homeschoolers may pose less risk of spreading disease, virtual students can and do participate in in-person school activities and thus had a different risk profile than those homeschooled. 

In fact, the Perry majority concluded that the state’s interest was so strong, and its policy so on point, that the law would pass strict scrutiny if that were the test to be applied, as the dissent argued.   

The dissent not only wanted strict scrutiny, it argued that the case should be evaluated not through the Jacobson framework, but rather under the framework from Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and Mahmoud v. Taylor, 606 U.S. 522 (2025).  Under Mahmoud in particular, a law that “substantially interferes with the religious development” of a child and the “critical right of parents to guide the religious development of their children” is subject to strict scrutiny “regardless of whether the law is neutral or generally applicable.”

But unlike Yoder and Mahmoud which would have required children to sit through lessons (formal or otherwise) that were in conflict with their parents’ religious beliefs, West Virginia’s vaccination law is a public health measure, not an form of ideological or value-based instruction or messaging.  The majority also found it notable that nothing in Yoder or Mahmoud purported to overrule, or even undermine, Jacobson, and the lower courts are obligated to follow those precedents unless and until the Supreme Court says otherwise.  Here’s to hoping that day never comes. 

But at least for now, in the Fourth Circuit, state vaccination mandates that (1) are facially neutral, (2) provide only medically grounded exemptions with constrained professional judgment and a review procedure, and (3) apply across the public school system will be evaluated under rational-basis review and are likely to be upheld, notwithstanding parental religious objections.

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That title might be overblown, because we are discussing only two cases.  But one of them is the Roundup case, and we could not resist the cheesy wordplay. 

Roundup is neither a drug nor device. It is regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), not the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Nevertheless, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) will feel familiar to our readers, because it preempts any state law “requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter.”  That express preemption did not stop a Missouri jury from concluding that Roundup labeling was inadequate because it did not warn of the risk of cancer.  But such a label would have contravened the EPA’s repeated conclusions that Roundup’s key ingredient, glyphosate, did not cause cancer. The jury verdict was a miscarriage of justice because the warning label demanded by the plaintiff would have made the product misbranded.  The product could not comply with both the federal and state law requirements. That impossibility means that the plaintiff’s claim should have been impliedly preempted as well as expressly preempted.  

The appellant brief is splendidly written. That is hardly a surprise, especially when we see the names of Paul Clement and Mike Imbroscio on the cover.  You should go on to the SCOTUS blog and read the brief.  See here. Among the many things that it does remarkably well, it takes a tour of the regulatory record and makes a compelling case that the EPA arrived at a sound scientific conclusion that glyphosate does not cause cancer, and that a contrary announcement by a working group of the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) — the main basis for the plaintiff’s claim — was bunk. 

As you would expect, many amicus briefs have been filed in this matter.  Most, sadly, side with the plaintiff.  But the one that counts the most was filed by the U.S. Solicitor General (sometimes referred to as the Tenth Justice) and that brief comes down forcefully in favor of express and implied preemption.  The SG also pounded home the concern that a cacophony of different state jury decisions will cause chaos: “Lost in that noise: EPA’s considered judgments about what warnings are actually necessary to protect public health, and any hope of uniformity.” 

We do not mean to suggest that the respondent brief was written by slouches. (We clerked for Ninth Circuit Judge William Norris, and he told us that when certiorari was granted for any of his decisions, he always was astounded by how wonderful the briefing was at the SCOTUS level.) The Keller Postman firm, along with others, is onboard, and they have ample intellectual wattage. Their brief is clever, thorough, and wrong.  They emphasize that FIFRA provides that the product’s registration is not a defense.  They argue that Roundup was misbranded because it was unsafe. Thus, according to their account, the plaintiff was seeking to vindicate FIFRA, not contradict it.  The respondent asserts that the defendant faced no impossibility.  If it could not change the label to match the IARC view, it could have simply stopped selling the product. 

Remarkably, the respondent also tried to exploit the SCOTUS decision in Loper Bright, suggesting it means that courts should not defer to the EPA’s determination that glyphosate does not cause cancer. (Long ago, we predicted this potential distortion of Loper by the plaintiffs’ bar.) Finally, the respondent argued that the defendant waived its arguments by failing to seek a Bates jury instruction at trial on the relevant FIFRA misbranding instructions.  Along the way, the respondent brief cites Marbury and Carolene Products in ways that seem, frankly, bizarre. 

To our admittedly biased eyes, the appellant briefing wins the day on all these arguments.  Preemptive force must be given to rules “under” FIFRA, which would cover the EPA’s determination that glyphosate does not cause cancer. The respondent wants to turn that “under” into a “by” and suggests there is no difference.  But Clement et al. point out that “There is no preposition exception to textualism.” The appellant also makes clear that the respondent’s stop-selling solution runs afoul of Bartlett. And one has to marvel at the temerity of the respondent to invoke Loper, given that Clement is the lawyer who won that case. The first rejoinder on the Loper issue is that it was not raised below, nor was it raised by any of the many amicus briefs. The respondent says that “is not the result of a collective failure to issue spot.” Second, Loper held that courts should not defer to agency statutory interpretation, but such statutory interpretation was not at issue here.  The FIFRA preemption provision is as clear as can be, and no one suggests the EPA acted outside its statutory authority. “Loper may change a lot, but it has zero relevance for that straightforward construction of FIFRA’s  unambiguous statutory text.”  That, friends, is a smack down.  

As for the procedural waiver argument, that was never raised by the plaintiff in the Missouri appellate courts, thereby “forfeiting any forfeiture.”  The last word – the ending of the appellant’s reply – is elegant: “FIFRA seeks balance and uniformity. The plaintiff’s bar seeks something altogether different, without regard to whether it drives products that farmers need from the market. The Court should vindicate Congress’ judgment.” 

The oral argument is on April 27. Bring your popcorn. 

We also want to alert our readers to certiorari briefing in BNSF Railway Co. v. Tanner Lynn.  The petition was filed by the great Lisa Blatt and her team at Williams & Connolly.  There is also an excellent amicus brief authored by the Washington Legal Foundation. The question presented is: “Whether the Commerce Clause permits a State to extract consent to jurisdiction from nonresident corporations as a condition of their right to do business in the State, even for cases involving nonresident plaintiffs and out-of-state conduct.” The BNSF cert petition invites the High Court to follow up on Justice Alito’s suggestion in the execrable Mallory decision that even if jurisdictional consent via corporate registration does not violate due process, it violates the dormant Commerce Clause.  (This blog has addressed the dormant Commerce Clause issue.)


Few cases caused such immediate mischief as Mallory did.  Litigation tourism, which had been reeled in by the Bauman and BMS cases, received a new lease on life from Mallory.  The cert petition pieces together the various decisions in Mallory to show that five justices seemed receptive to the dormant Commerce Clause argument. As has been said more than once, the key to SCOTUS litigation is being able to count to five. States like Pennsylvania in Mallory, or Minnesota in BNSF, have “no legitimate local interest” in “adjudicating a foreign-cubed lawsuit.”

We very much hope that SCOTUS grants cert for the BNSF case. It is the right case, the right time, and the right advocate. 

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FDA-regulated products now account for an estimated one-fifth of overall economic activity in the U.S. They have also been the focus of a litigation explosion. This timely guide covers all aspects of litigation involving drugs, medical devices, vaccines and other FDA-regulated prescription products.
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