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We previously posted about plaintiffs’ shenanigans in attempting to defeat diversity in a medical device case removed to the Northern District of Illinois. Plaintiffs’ antics were unsuccessful, and the federal court denied plaintiff’s motion remand.  Today’s decision addresses the defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ third amended complaint in the same case, and it is very favorable from a preemption standpoint. Miller v. Rush University Medical Center, 2026 WL 147413 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 2026).

Miller involves a cervical disc replacement device (the “Mobi-C”). The device includes an accompanying inserter with a “depth stop” mechanism used to prevent the Mobi-C from going too far into the spinal cord during insertion. Plaintiff and his spouse sued the device manufacturer, the distributor, two sales representatives, the hospital, and the treating physician based on claims that he suffered spinal cord contusions during surgery. The defendants moved to dismiss, with the manufacturer and distributor arguing that all claims against them were preempted. The court agreed.  Continue Reading PMA Preemption in the Northern District of Illinois

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We write a lot about the learned intermediary rule. It’s a fundamental aspect of the defense of drug and device cases, it’s grounded in the realities of the physician-patient relationship, and it tends to produce a lot of cases worth blogging about. We also refer to it as a rule (e.g., here, here, here, and here), rather than a doctrine, because that’s what it is.  We particularly like it when courts dismiss warnings claims based on the learned intermediary rule at the pleadings stage.   Today’s case is one of those. Plaintiff filed a shoddy complaint, was able to amend in response to an initial motion to dismiss, and then saw his warnings claims dismissed with prejudice under Alabama’s learned intermediary rule.

In McCrackin v. Rex Medical L.P., 2026 WL 66797 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 8, 2026), the plaintiff alleged he received an Option retrievable IVC filter in 2012. Twelve years later, he allegedly suffered complications when a “leg” from the filter fractured and penetrated a vein, with the further allegation that his spine grew around the fractured leg. He sued based on allegations that the device was marketed as permanent when it should have been temporary, and that there were not adequate warnings about the risk of “tilt, fracture, migration and/or perforation.” Id. at *1. Plaintiff previously obtained leave to file an amended complaint in response to an initial motion to dismiss, so this was his second bite at the apple. The defendant who marketed and distributed the device moved to dismiss.Continue Reading Learned Intermediary Success at the 12(b) Stage in Alabama (plus a Double Whammy)

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This post is from the non-Dechert and non-RS side of the Blog.

Depending on the time, issue, and players, the supposed epithets of “judicial activism” or “activist judge” can be thrown in just about every juridical direction.  If we were to try to parse out the most common reason for the use of these terms

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It’s all too much. Mass torts, especially those involving drugs or devices, suffer from a severe case of too-muchness. Too much of what? Cases, defendants, prevaricating experts, documents taken out of context, appeals to outrage, eye-watering verdicts, etc. In the good old days when people got together physically, not virtually, for parties (especially this time

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This post comes from the non-Reed Smith side of the blog.

The phrase may be biblical in origin, coming from the story of Cain and Abel, but its meaning certainly persists and has relevance today.  Being both a sibling and a parent of siblings, this blogger doesn’t want to give the impression that her family

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Back in 2012, we published our “Distribute This!” post about In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Products Liability Litigation (No. II), 2012 WL 181411 (D.N.J. Jan. 17, 2012), lauding its ruling that, under the “independence principle” of PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604 (2011), and Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett,

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You’ll find plenty of decisions from the amiodarone litigation discussed on the blog.  Not surprisingly, because it is a generic drug, they almost exclusively focus on Mensing preemption – or we should say on plaintiffs’ attempts to bypass Mensing.  But there are cases involving exposure to the branded product as well.  And earlier this