Bexis has already plugged the Reed Smith Life Sciences CLE programs this week, so we won’t replug — except to remind you that Rachel Weil and the drudge/author of this post will tomorrow discuss the taxonomy and tactics of warning causation. We talk in terms of taxonomy because there are so many interesting variations of the contents of the warning, the relevant audience, doctors who read, who didn’t read, who already know, and who would like to have known, as well as the rules and burdens of proof in jurisdictions around this great, over-warned country.
It turns out that Kentucky offers some good pro-defense law on warning causation but, then again, there is some weird, unnerving stuff courtesy of the Sixth Circuit. Tune in tomorrow for details. In the meantime, we (obviously) have a preference for clear rules, even though the muddy areas are (obviously) where good lawyers can make a difference and earn their money.
There’s nothing wrong with being obvious. In today’s case, Adamson v. Lupin Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2022 WL 3448044 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 17, 2022), we get a blissfully clear and obvious ruling from a Kentucky court, and it is in our favorite legal area, preemption, to boot. The plaintiff in Adamson alleged that he suffered from Stevens-Johnson Syndrome (SJS) — a serious disease that causes the top layer of the skin to die and shed — as a result of taking generic amlodipine besylate. If you are one of those folks wrestling with hypertension, you might have some familiarity with amlodipine.
The Adamson complaint included a messy mixture of claims for failure to warn, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, defective design, and breach of warranties. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that all the claims were preempted by federal law. The court agreed with the defendant, dismissed the complaint, and did not waste any time in doing so.
Continue Reading W.D. Kentucky Dismisses Amlodipine Claims on Preemption Grounds
