Covid-19 is not over. Per doctor advice (namely, that geezers whose primary form of exercise consists of removing Meursault corks should do their best to avoid Covid) we recently received yet another Covid-19 jab. We’re not up to double digits yet, but cannot be far from it. For those of you who would gleefully castigate
Express Preemption
At Least Pennsylvania Is Not That Completely Different
Back in 2020, we encountered Gustafson v. Springfield, Inc., 2020 Pa. Super. Lexis 843 (Pa. Super. Sept. 20, 2020), a decision so bizarre that it reminded us of a Monty Python movie. That decision “employ[ed] a rationale, at once both paleolithically conservative and pro-plaintiffly radical, that would render any federal “tort reform” statute unconstitutional.” Gustafson involved a federal statute that preempted most tort litigation involving firearms, the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act of 2005, 15 U.S.C. §§7901, et seq., (“PLCAA”), and declared that the PLCAA violated the Tenth Amendment.
Since it did not involve prescription medical product liability litigation, the Blog did not follow Gustafson all that closely – our last mention of it was in 2021, noting that en banc reargument had been granted and the singular panel opinion had been withdrawn. However, the decision that resulted from the reargument was a mess. Gustafson v. Springfield, Inc., 282 A.3d 739 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc), produced no majority and five different opinions from the nine judges. Moreover, the overall result, which was to reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the suit, was contrary to the majority votes of the individual judges. How could that be? Here’s a brief description from a Pennsylvania appellate procedure article Bexis wrote about Gustafson:
The outcome in Gustafson thus differed dramatically from the votes of the nine en banc judges on the merits of the two issues. The outcome was 5-4 in favor of reversal, as four judges would reverse on constitutional grounds, and one judge would reverse solely on statutory grounds. On both of the two issues, however, the position advocated by the defendants was in the majority. Seven justices agreed that, factually, the Arms Act was applicable to the Gustafson plaintiffs’ claims. By a slimmer margin of 5-4, a majority of the Gustafson judges agreed that the Arms Act was constitutional.
J. Beck, “What Happens When Precedent Splinters? A Look at Gustafson,” Law.com (Nov. 17, 2022).
This bizarre result had one beneficial effect, it virtually forced the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to take the inevitable appeal in order to clean up the mess. Which it did. See Gustafson v. Springfield, Inc., 296 A.3d 560 (Pa. 2023) (granting review).
And last month, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did indeed clean up the mess. See Gustafson v. Springfield, Inc., 2025 Pa. Lexis 442 (Pa. March 31, 2025).Continue Reading At Least Pennsylvania Is Not That Completely Different
N.C. Supreme Court Refuses to Extend PREP Act Preemption to Constitutional Claims
The recent case of Happel v. Guilford County Bd. of Educ., 2025 N.C. LEXIS 191, 2025 WL 879618 (N.C. March 21, 2005), will probably provoke a political debate, but that is not why your friendly neighborhood DDL blog has it up for discussion today. In Happel, the North Carolina Supreme Court created an…
Tubal Ligation Clip Claims Held to be Preempted
Bergdoll v. Coopersurgical, Inc., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38300 (W.D. Mo. March 4, 2025), is a good Class III medical device preemption decision. The device was a Filshie clip, which is used to perform tubal ligations. The claim in Bergdoll is the typical one that the clip migrated and caused adverse symptoms. Bergdoll is…
Taking Preemption to the Bank
Rieger v. Medtronic Minimed, Inc., 2025 Cal. Super. Lexis 14 (Cal. Super. L.A. Cnty. Jan. 28, 2025), is an excellent PMA preemption decision from, of all places, Los Angeles County Superior Court, in California – home of the notorious “the Bank” courthouse. We have no idea whether Rieger was adjudicated in LA’s Central Civil West Courthouse, but that is the first thing we defense hacks think of when we see a “Cal. Super. L.A. Cnty.” citation.
But a few more like Rieger, and maybe we won’t any longer.Continue Reading Taking Preemption to the Bank
Double Shot Thursday: Express Preemption Based on an OTC Drug Monograph and The Delaney Clause and Personal Injury Litigation— FDA Delists Color Additive Red No. 3, But Will It Be Enough to Attract Even Dyed-in-the-Wool Plaintiffs Lawyers?
Like the radio stations of yore did with songs, we offer up two related posts back-to-back instead of the usual one. We cannot offer a “favorite artist” as the source of consecutive songs, we offer two posts that relate to the legal implications of some of the typical things that FDA does and has been…
FDCA Preemption Delivers Sweet Win for Sugar Substitute Manufacturer
C.D. Cal. Dismisses Acne OTC/Benzene Claims as Preempted
It might seem that we talk about preemption incessantly on this blog, but a pretty good opinion from a pretty important jurisdiction went unremarked by us last September. We’ll rectify that right now. Call it an end of year clean up session.
The decision in Howard v. Alchemee, LLC, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169359…
A Five-STAR Preemption Decision from the N.D. Okla.
Today we report on the court’s order granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss in Keim-Bacon v. Stryker Corp., No. 4:22-CV-00383-WPJ-MTS, 2024 WL 4886051, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 25, 2024). It is a straightforward application of Riegel preemption that gets it right on all fronts.
The Scandinavian Total Ankle Replacement System (“STAR”) is a Class…