This post is from the non-Reed Smith side of the blog.
They say it’s better to be lucky than good. But in Luckey v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 2026 WL 836122 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 26, 2026), plaintiff was neither.
This is a straightforward—and satisfying—PMA preemption decision involving a heart valve allegedly marketed to last at
We commented about the King v. DePuy litigation several years ago because this was one of the cases where Pinnacle Hip plaintiffs tried and failed to use a turncoat expert. Well, this long-running (since 2013) – due mostly to execrable MDL management (8 years with no movement) rather than either parties’ fault – lawsuit
Some cases feel brand new. Others feel like a remake you didn’t ask for—but somehow know all the lines to already. This one is firmly in the latter category. For those of us who have been around long enough to remember dial-up internet and the original pedicle screw litigation, this case reads like a throwback.
December 9, 2026? What is that about?
Well, December 9, 2026 is the deadline for each member nation within the European Union to have incorporated the EU’s new Product Liability Directive (“PLD”) into their own national laws. In key markets like Germany, that work is well underway.
Not every EU member state will meet
Not quite three years ago, we co-authored a chapter in a Digital Health guide put out by International Comparative Legal Guides. It bore the pithy title “Predicting Risk and Examining the Intersection of Traditional Principles of Product Liability Laws with Digital Health.” We continue to tinker with the principles of product liability law
We have been mulling over Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024) and federal preemption.
Yes, we need a life, but let’s put that aside for the moment.
In particular, we’ve been reviewing a rash of complaints where plaintiffs contend that the FDA’s decisions about whether to grant or deny premarket approval
We’ve been defending drug and device litigation for a long time, and we’ve seen many plaintiffs who experienced real injuries. Those of us at the blog, our colleagues at other defense firms, and our clients are genuinely sympathetic to injuries a plaintiff actually experienced. Many plaintiffs we’ve encountered also endured terrible circumstances earlier in their lives. Some of those can be heartbreaking. Defending cases on the basis that our clients’ products did not cause the injury or that the injury was a known and warned of risk doesn’t mean the defense bar looks askance at plaintiffs and their experiences. But, when we see a case involving a syringe needle purportedly propelled into a plaintiff’s derrière, some of us might exhibit a moment of minor moral weakness and include the above title in a blog post. Mea culpa.
Today’s case, Rudzinskas v. Retractable Techs., Inc., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191860 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 2025), involves a type of syringe that automatically retracts once the plunger handle is fully depressed. Plaintiff’s husband regularly administered vitamin B-12 shots to her and had been doing so for six or seven years. Plaintiff claimed that, on one of those occasions, the needle from defendant’s syringe “shot into [her] like a slingshot.” Id. at *4. Plaintiff went to the hospital and an ultrasound suggested the needle was embedded in the plaintiff’s buttock. Plaintiff underwent surgery to have the needle removed, but the surgeon was not able to extract it. Continue Reading A Real Pain in the . . .
The preemption case du jour is Gregory v. Boston Sci. Corp., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164801, 2025 WL 2452382 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2025), in which the Eastern District of New York granted summary judgment on federal preemption grounds.
Every time we see a case that does that—upholds preemption on summary judgment—we wonder
Today’s decision, Croci v. Zoll Medical Corp., 2025 WL 2307728 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2025), is a straightforward, preemption-based 12(b)(6) dismissal of a complaint involving a Class III medical device. The case involves claims about a Life Vest, which is worn externally and monitors the wearer’s heart rate. The device is able to detect ventricular tachycardia and ventricular fibrillation, and it can deliver a therapeutic shock to restore the wearer’s heart rate to a normal rhythm. The complaint alleged that the decedent experienced problems with the Life Vest, and that a representative of the Life Vest’s manufacturer visited the decedent’s home to “desensitize the device.” Id. at *1. Shortly after the alleged visit from the representative, the decedent experienced a cardiac arrest and died.Continue Reading PMA Preemption in the Southern District of New York
Today’s post is our second installment about a case in the District of Massachusetts alleging injury from a Class III medical device. We blogged about it this spring when the court dismissed plaintiff’s claim that an implanted defibrillator and associated leads caused her numerous, unnecessary shocks. The court dismissed that complaint based on straightforward, premarket approval preemption. But the court granted plaintiff leave to amend, and she moved to file an amended complaint. Today’s decision, Summers v. Medtronic, Inc., 2025 WL 2201110 (D. Mass. Aug. 1, 2025), denied plaintiff’s motion for leave based on the learned intermediary rule in Massachusetts. It’s a helpful decision because it applies the learned intermediary rule at the 12(b)(6) stage in the context of a device recall.Continue Reading Summers Round 2: Learned Intermediary Rule Applies to Claim Based on Device Recall