By taking a look at Akerlund v. Atlas Air, Inc., 2026 WL 1993146 (11th Cir. July 10, 2026), that makes this the third straight week in which we are pleased with a sensible vaccine decision. In this published case, the Eleventh Circuit affirms that an airline’s COVID-19 vaccination mandate did not subject its employees who
There’s an old joke about a guy who keeps banging his head against the wall. When asked why, he says: Because it feels so good when I stop. That’s roughly how we feel about watching defendants in medical device cases make preemption arguments under the shadow of Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470
It’s hard to think of any recent litigation where plaintiffs didn’t seek overblown discovery about adverse event reports and then have their experts rely on those reports in an effort to establish causation. But as we’ve blogged about repeatedly, reports from the FDA’s Adverse Event Reporting System (“FAERS”) do not establish causation (and, for good measure, they don’t constitute newly acquired information). Today’s decision, Taylor v. Dixon, 2026 WL 865183 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2026), is a little different since it involves a federal habeas petition. But we couldn’t resist blogging about it given the court’s comprehensive take-down of the attempted use of an adverse event report to show causation.
Continue Reading Adverse Event Reports May Not Be Used to Establish Causation
This post is from the non-Butler Snow side of the blog.
Back in November, we told you the court in the In re Paragard IUD Products Liability Litigation wasn’t quite finished with plaintiffs’ effort to impose a post-sale duty to warn on a company that didn’t manufacture, sell, or even own the product when it
Today’s post is not from the Butler Snow side of the blog.
It’s five days post-Thanksgiving and if you are like the majority of us, there are still leftovers in your fridge. But according to food safety experts, yesterday was likely the last day for the turkey, mashed potatoes, stuffing, gravy, and casseroles. Some legal
As we’ve discussed before, Florida’s offer of judgment statute has real teeth. Under the Florida statute (Fla. Stat. § 768.79), a defendant can recover its costs and attorney’s fees if the other side rejects the offer and ultimately recovers 25% less than the amount of the offer. The risk of paying the defendant’s attorney’s fees ought to be a meaningful deterrent to meritless claims.
In today’s decision, Jacob v. Mentor Worldwide LLP, 2025 WL 3134227 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2025) (rep. & rec.), the defendant made an offer of judgment under the Florida statute. But that didn’t deter the pro se plaintiff from pursuing her claim that a ruptured breast implant caused her to develop lupus-like symptoms. As we blogged about here, following a lengthy and tumultuous procedural history, the defendant ultimately prevailed on summary judgment. Prior to moving for summary judgment, the defendant made an offer of judgment of $3,500, which was the amount of its limited warranty for implant ruptures. After obtaining summary judgment, the defendant moved for its costs and attorney’s fees.
Continue Reading Chomp Chomp – Taking a Bite with Florida’s Offer of Judgment Statute
We call a treating physician who testifies to more than just their treatment a hybrid expert. But doctors who both treat and testify can sometimes be less “Doctor Do No Harm” and more “Doctor Show Me the Money.” And when their treatment comes under a letter of protection (“LOP”), things get even murkier. Like, swampy
We’ve blogged recently about good preemption decisions in the Filshie Clips litigation from the Southern District of Texas (per Bexis, “as good a PMA medical device preemption decision as a defendant has a right to expect”) and the Northern District of Georgia. Today we add another preemption win in the same litigation from the
Surely, you’ve heard the definition of insanity as repeating the same conduct but expecting different results. You might also have heard that Einstein said it, though that might not be right – not even relatively right.
It is definitely not right for plaintiffs to keep filing meritless actions even after they keep receiving benchslaps. Maybe
We really cannot say whether chicken by any other name would smell as sweet or even as chickeny. While we do not compare ourselves to the Bard, we can say that cultivated chicken meat cannot be sold in Florida to allow any such olfactory comparison there. The manufacturer of just such a product challenged the