In our How Not To Create an “Exception” to the Learned Intermediary Rule post two years ago, we criticized a couple of Texas trial court cases for attempting to create a company compensation exception to the learned intermediary rule, that prior decisions had almost universally rejected. That post includes a comprehensive discussion of nationwide precedent
Court composition matters.
Yesterday, the Florida Supreme Court reversed a ruling from only last year and decided that the legislature was right (or at least within its authority) after all – henceforth the standards created in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), will govern the admissibility of expert testimony in…
It can sometimes be difficult for us here at the DDL Blog to address “mixed bag” cases. We are quite clear that we are a defense side blog. Love us or hate us – we don’t pull punches. We hoard and covet preemption and learned intermediary wins and treat each one like the gem that…
This post is from the non-Reed Smith side of the blog.
Looking back on the blog, the last time we posted about the Pelvic Mesh MDL was this summer when we lauded a remand judge for not allowing plaintiffs to expand their expert reports to include opinions already excluded by the MDL judge. At that…
Implied Preemption. Off-label promotion. TwIqbal. They make up a core of our posts, yet we never seem to tire of them. Maybe our readers, especially interlopers from the other side of the v., tire of reading about them, but we can often find a wrinkle in a case that merits our huzzahs or inspires…
This post is from the non-Reed Smith side of the blog.
We understand that illnesses and injuries can be emotional; sometime extremely emotional and rightfully so. We understand that some treatments can add to the stress. We certainly understand that when a treatment results in complications or does not turn out as hoped, an already…
That’s Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006), the most bizarre use of res judicata that we’ve ever seen – giving preclusive effect to a class action verdict despite also finding that the class was not certifiable. Anyway, continuing in the tradition of unusual, pro-plaintiff results from the Florida Supreme…
Over the years, comedian Adam Carolla has played the “Germany or Florida” game on his various radio and tv programs and podcasts. The game is based on the observation that many of the most bizarre stories of human ineptitude come from Germany or Florida. Callers describe News of the Weird headlines, and Carolla and guests try to guess whether the events happened in Germany or Florida. You can listen to this segment from the old Loveline radio show.
Here are some examples of “Germany or Florida” clues:
- Man ate his dog.
- Carjacker forced to flee after realizing he could not drive a stick-shift.
- Trio shoots at imaginary foe, thereby attracting police to their homegrown meth lab.
- Naked swimmer hospitalized after angler hooks his penis.
- Man dies after blowing up condom machine.
- Sister assaults twin over sexy toy.
- Government creates blatant ex post facto law depriving tobacco companies of basic tort defenses.
Okay, you probably know about that last one. The answers to the others are below. By the way, Carolla is not alone in identifying The Sunshine State as also being The Sublimely Strange State. 30 Rock had a running gag about Florida craziness. See examples here. Also, Seth Meyers on the Late Show runs a “Fake or Florida” bit that can, at best, be charitably labeled as being derivative of Carolla’s gag. On last Sunday’s Last Week Tonight, John Oliver reported a story about a Florida man who planned to bomb Target stores up and down the east coast, with the idea of buying up Target stock on the cheap afterwards. After pointing out how the story involved home-made explosives, a big box store, and a terrible get-rich-quick scheme, Oliver noted that if the story also had a snake on meth, we would have full-on Florida Bingo.
Even before we earned our law license, we were aware that there is something … different … about Florida’s legal system. In our law school library, you could pull the 12 So. 2d volume off the shelf and it would automatically open up to the Lason v. State case, in which the Florida Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a 76 year old man for “abominable and detestable crimes against nature.” Some law school libraries have needed to insert photocopies of the Lason case after the original pages were worn out completely. Good times.
Last week there was a mini-eruption of Florida case law, and we will cover some of those opinions this week. It is not quite Shark Week for our blog, but it is close. Today’s case, Wolicki-Gables v. Doctors Same Day Surgery, Ltd., 2017 WL 603316 (Fla. DCA 2d Feb. 15, 2017), is unusual. The case is ostensibly about spoliation, but it is really about preemption and the dreaded parallel claim exception. Luckily, the case comes out the right way. But getting there was like doing a couple of laps on Mr. Toad’s Wild Ride. (You didn’t think you were getting out of this blogpost without at least one Disney World reference, did you?)
Mrs. Wolicki-Gables claimed a physical injury from a failed pain pump system. She and her husband initially sued the manufacturer of the pain pump, alleging causes of action for strict liability and negligence. The case was filed in state court, but was then removed to federal court. The pain pump system had received pre-market approval from the FDA. Because of that fact, and because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Riegel, the federal court held that the Wolicki-Gables’ product liability claims against the manufacturer were preempted by federal law. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer.
Devoted as we are to the defense of manufacturers of prescription drugs and medical devices, we have often advocated for the full implication of the fundamental—to us, at least—requirements that warnings claims focus on the decision making of the learned intermediary and that proximate cause matters. One implication is that heeding presumptions typically make little sense for claims about these products. It is one thing to say that a plaintiff should be allowed to proceed with a warnings claim when a prescriber is truly unavailable to provide testimony—like by dying before the plaintiff knew he had a claim—and the alleged missing warning would have clearly contraindicated the plaintiff from receiving the prescription product. In such a case, it might make sense to presume, absent contrary evidence, that the physician would have heeded the warning and not prescribed the product to the plaintiff. In just about every other prescription drug and device case we can imagine, the heeding presumption does not make sense.
We feel the same way about a post-sale duty to warn. Not only do such duties run contrary to the typical focus in warnings cases on the notice to the manufacturer of potential risks before the product leaves its control (or is prescribed to plaintiff), but the proximate cause inquiry can quickly become an exercise in layered speculation. Cases acknowledging such a post-sale duty have typically involved situations where the seller had a continuing relationship with the purchaser, with an obvious route for relaying additional information about the product in a way that allows a jury to evaluate whether injury would have been avoided. In prescription drug and device cases, there tends not to be any direct relationship at any time and the manufacturer does not know the names or addresses of patients using its products. Over time, patients move, change their physicians, and even see physicians for reasons unrelated to the reason they were prescribed a drug or device in the past. Over time, manufacturers also stop selling specific products or product lines and may even go out of business. When it comes to drugs with alleged remote effects or devices that are implanted for many years, these real world considerations make potentially unlimited post-sale duties to warn a folly. We could go on, but we will not.
In his poem “To Summer,” Blake begs the season to “curb thy fierce steeds, allay the heat/That flames from their large nostrils!” That is typical Blake; he takes our favorite time of the year and turns it into a satanic beast. We’d prefer to consider the delightful aromas that Summer brings to our nostrils: beach,…