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This post comes from the non-RS side of the Blog.

Prescription medications for psychiatric conditions fill an important role in modern healthcare.  They tend to have labels with lots of information about the risks of various emotional, psychological, and neuroreceptor-mediated conditions, including worsening of the underlying conditions being treated, interactions with other medications or substances, issues during starting or stopping the medication, and the risks of conditions that are also known to occur at increased rates with the underlying conditions.  There has also been plenty of litigation over the risks of these medications, along with the risk of psychological injuries with medications that affect brain chemistry (e.g., Parkinson’s medications, smoking cessation medications).  While we certainly do not minimize the gravity of the psychiatric conditions being treated or allegedly caused by the medications in these litigations, we do have some recurring concerns about how they fit within broader product liability law.  One of its bedrock principles is that the plaintiff needs to have suffered a physical injury or injury to property.  That makes sense given standing requirements, which usually require a tangible injury and not just something fuzzy like taking offense to something the plaintiff observed.  In addition, statutes of limitations work better with tangible, physical injuries than with intangible injuries and subclinical injuries.  Damages can be measured for loss caused by an injury, but you cannot really skip ahead to damages without the injury.  We have seen this play out over and over as the vast majority of courts to have considered proposed actions for medical monitoring without present physical injury, subclinical injuries, increased risk of injury, and fear of future injury have rejected them as incompatible with centuries of common law.  Even causes of action expressly for emotions distress, whether inflicted intentionally or negligently, still typically require physical contact or at least being in the “zone of danger” (not to be confused with “danger zone” from which one should strongly consider flying away).

For purely psychological injuries allegedly caused by taking a prescription medication for a psychiatric condition, we add our concern about the subjective nature of evidence used to prove or contest injury and causation.  If a plaintiff’s alleged injury is “I felt a certain way” or “I felt compelled to do a certain thing” and the alleged damages are either that the feeling was upsetting or that medical expenses were incurred to treat that feeling, then is this really a compensable personal injury?  Setting aside that the plaintiff probably gave informed consent about just such a possibility and sued anyway, this a far cry from the sort of injury usually at issue in a product liability case.  Of course, it is quite different if there is a clear injury to person or property that resulted from a psychological “side effect” (e.g., confusion causing a car accident) or psychological damages following a significant physical injury (e.g., depression following the loss of a limb).  While we have dealt with some of these issues in various litigations over the years, we see the overarching issue of “what is a compensable issue for purposes of product liability” percolating behind a number of cases recently.

In Stockwell v. Sumitomo Pharma America, Inc., No. 2:25-cv-00492-RAJ, 2026 WL 791614 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 20, 2026), the court did not address these big issues in dismissing all the claims in the case, albeit with leave to amend three counts.  They are clearly there, though, especially if you pay attention to what information was omitted from the complaint (as inferred from the decision) and peruse the label of the medication at issue.  (The plaintiff is a lawyer who is representing himself.  We have heard an aphorism about that situation.) 

The Stockwell plaintiff was prescribed an antipsychotic medication, presumably for his schizophrenia and/or bipolar disorder—the decision does not say for which or by whom.  Perhaps predictably, the decision is not terribly clear about which of the thoughts or feelings described during his short time titrating up his dose of the medication, his short time tapering down and discontinuing the medication, and the period after discontinuation was being claimed as an injury as opposed to something else.  Given the focus of the alleged failure to warn arguments, though, the case is about two intangible feelings:  akathisia (a feeling of an urge to move) and suicidal ideation (thinking about suicide without attempting it).  These conditions, like the “panic attack” and insomnia also mentioned in plaintiff’s history in the decision, are all over the labeling for the antipsychotic medication, including that akathisia may occur during titration up and that suicidal ideation may persist after discontinuation.  Of course, suicidal ideation and, unfortunately, suicide are greatly increased with both schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.  Plaintiff’s akathisia did not result in physical injuries and his suicidal ideations did not result in any attempt or physical injuries, but he did get some care for both, adjust his job (without loss of income), and discontinue his medication.  While some patients in his position may be relieved at the lack of actual injury, which could arguably be connected to the flow of risk information on the antipsychotic medication through his physicians to him, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the prescription medication a few years later, throwing out fairly predictable but poorly developed causes of action.  The defendant moved to dismiss all of them.

Plaintiff’s complaint asserted exceedingly boilerplate allegations under general headings, and he focused them ever so slightly during briefing.  First up, using our characterization of the purported cause of action at issue in each count, was a claim for design defect under the Washington Product Liability Act.  Relying heavily on a case from the same court we discussed here, the court held that claims based on changing an approved drug’s formulation are preempted.  2026 WL 791614, *3.  So, the design defect claim in Stockwell, which clearly turned on the drug’s formulation, was dismissed with prejudice.  That this is now so well-established, when we still remember back when it was anything but, warms our Blogging hearts.

Next up was a count based on the allegation that the defendant’s “product was not reasonably safe in construction or because it did not conform to the manufacturer’s express or implied warranties.”  Id.  The court generously construed the first part as an attempt to assert a manufacturing defect claim.  Taking a look at the WPLA, that may be the closest recognized claim to what plaintiff asserted, but his count was not supported by factual allegations to satisfy TwIqbal.  In particular, what was missing is precisely what would be needed to get in the ballpark of a manufacturing defect claim, “how the treatment Plaintiff received deviated from its design or performance standards or what specific aspect of the product posed a danger.”  Id. (internal punctuation and citation omitted).  Plaintiff was permitted to try to replead this claim because the court determined that it was not a preempted design claim.  Id. at *3 n.3.  As we have discussed elsewhere, though, it the challenge to the drug’s construction is general, then it really is a design defect claim.

Plaintiff also asserted a warnings claim, variously characterized as sounding in negligence and strict liability.  Without diving into abrogation under the WPLA—which the Stockwell decision did not do—it looks like a hybrid statutory claim is all that exists in Washington.  The Stockwell court first analyzed whether the claim was preempted before turning to whether the complaint properly asserted a claim at all.  We think that is the wrong order of analysis, but the court got the right result anyway.  The complaint did not assert any failure to warn the prescribing physician of the risks of akathisia or suicidal ideation, and Washington follows the learned intermediary doctrine, so the claim failed.  Id. at *5.  Plaintiff would have been permitted to amend, except that any warnings claim he asserted would have been preempted anyway.  Citing Albrecht and some of the cases that displayed a greater understanding of the CBE process than was butchered in Levine, the court accepted the position that the plaintiff had to plead a non-preempted warnings claim based on newly acquired information about the relevant risks since the last approved label that could have permitted an independent change to the label through the CBE process.  Id. at *4.  Again, we harken back to the dark days after Levine before enough decisions, including Mensing and Albrecht, made it clear that facts supporting a CBE labeling change for the right issue during the right time would be the exception rather than the rule.  Here, plaintiff pled nothing about newly acquired information in the less than three years since FDA approved a label that discussed the relevant risks extensively.  Id.  Instead, on briefing, he offered mere speculation that there could be additional information the defendant had that FDA did not, but that does not count.  Id. at *5 (quoting the Gibbons case we discussed at length here).  “Plaintiff was not met his burden to allege newly acquired information regarding the risk of suicidality secondary to akathisia that created a labeling deficiency correctable through the CBE regulation.”  Id.  Plaintiff was not afforded another chance to plead a non-preempted warnings claim.

Next up were express and implied warranty claims, which were governed by the WPLA and were so boilerplate as to be confused with an actual metal plate affixed to a boiler.  Predictably, these were not sufficiently pled and were dismissed.  Unfortunately, plaintiff will get to replead them.  The court “reject[ed] Defendant’s argument that Count IV is a common law breach of warranty claim subject to preemption by the WPLA, *6 n.4, but there is the larger issue of how the implied warranty claim will inevitably be based on the same impermissible reformulation of the drug that the court held preempted as the design defect claim.

Last was a vague WPLA claim for “misrepresentation or concealment,” which was unsupported by the basic required factual allegations.  Consistent with not applying the heightened pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) for “fraud or mistake,” the Stockwell court gave plaintiff another shot at pleading.  However, to the extent that the alleged misrepresentation or concealment relates to the content of FDA-approved labeling—and there is not much else it could relate to—it will be preempted under the same analysis the court already undertook on the warnings claim.

So, plaintiff will get another chance to plead some of his claims with factual bases and without running smack into implied preemption.  The court may never end up having to resolve whether plaintiff suffered a legally cognizable injury.  Our feeling is that plaintiff’s apparent inability to plead a non-preempted cause of action stems, at least in part, from his alleged injury being simultaneously intangible and fuzzy.  That is just our feeling, though.

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On February 11, we blogged about the New Jersey Appellate Court’s disqualification of a lead plaintiff firm (Beasley Allen) in the Johnson & Johnson New Jersey state court talc litigation because that firm had been canoodling with a lawyer who had formerly worked for J&J.  Okay, “canoodling” is not exactly a technical, legal term, but we will soon get to what that means and why it matters.  Recall that the New Jersey Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s ruling of no disqualification. Since that Appellate disqualification ruling, the plaintiff firm has been feverishly trying to stay and overturn that ruling. So far, the New Jersey Appellate Court and Supreme Court have done nothing to halt the disqualification.  

Now things have gotten worse for the plaintiff firm, because last week the New Jersey federal court that is overseeing the multidistrict litigation (MDL) regarding J&J talc arrived at the same result. The disqualification ruling in In re Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Prods. Marketing, Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab. Litigation, 2026 WL 837332 (D. N.J. March 26, 2026), means that the plaintiff firm has now been disqualified in both the New Jersey state coordinated proceedings and the MDL. That is a big deal, and is a very bad result for the plaintiff firm. But it is the right result, and the federal court does a good job of explaining why that is so. 

Just as with the state court qualification, the key issue is the status of a lawyer who had formerly worked for J&J and had been intimately involved with settlement strategy. That lawyer later set up Legacy Liability Solutions LLC, which purported to offer a solution to mass tort liabilities, such as those presented in the talc MDL. That lawyer remains active and authorized to practice law, but says that he does not practice law or act in the capacity of an attorney at Legacy. Does that matter?  We shall see.  [Spoiler alert: it does not matter.]

Legacy made a pitch to J&J to take ownership of talc liabilities and fund current and future talc claims. It would be a form of settlement. Now if Legacy had merely made such a proposal to J&J, there might not be much of a controversy. But the problem is that Legacy was walking on both sides of the street. Legacy engaged in discussions with the plaintiff talc firm regarding settlement proposals to present to J&J. The topics focused on such things as a term sheet and claims administration. That is the “canoodling,” and that canoodling went to the heart of settlement negotiations. That canoodling is part of a zero-sum game where one side’s benefit is the other side’s detriment. What’s the best evidence of that? The MDL Plaintiff Steering Committee (PSC) asserted the mediation privilege over its discussions with Legacy. That is, the PSC did not want J&J to know what Legacy and the PSC were discussing. Why do you suppose that is? As a plaintiff lawyer once told us during settlement negotiations long ago, “I was born at night, but it wasn’t last night.”

Nevertheless, the turncoat lawyer (at this point that does not seem like an unfair or overly dramatic characterization) denied that he had shared any J&J confidences with the plaintiff lawyers. But the evidence was clear that it would be “impossible” for  the turncoat lawyer to separate out what he learned from his prior representation of J&J. One thinks of the current Apple TV drama Severance, where people’s minds are wholly separated between their work and home lives, each half knowing nothing of the other. (Yes, there are days when that would seem to be a splendid relief.) That scenario, of course, is science fiction. In any event, the conflicted lawyer admitted that he would not have been able to do what he was doing if he was acting as a lawyer in his dealings with the plaintiff lawyers.  That admission was inescapable in light of Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 1.9(a)(“A lawyer who has represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another client in the same or a substantially related matter in which that client’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent confirmed in writing.”). As with the state court disqualification decision, the issue turns on the application of RPC 5.3(c)(1), which calls for disqualification when a lawyer employs, retains, “or associates with a nonlawyer” who engages in conduct that, if he were a lawyer, would violate the RPC, and the lawyer ordered or “ratified” the nonlawyer’s conduct.

Beasley argued that the state appellate court went astray by overinterpreting the word “associates.” But the federal court had little difficulty consulting authorities such as Black’s Law Dictionary, the Oxford English Dictionary, and good old Merriam-Webster to determine that “associates” covered the relationship between the turncoat lawyer and the plaintiff lawyers to extract a settlement from J&J. RPC 5.3 applies to “associates” such as document vendors who are doing a good deal less substantive work than the turncoat lawyer was performing in this case. The plaintiff firm leaned hard on the fact that it never formally employed the turncoat lawyer, but that means precisely nothing under RPC 5.3. As the federal court reasoned, “By stating ‘or associates with,’ the plain language and context of the Rule lead to the unremarkable conclusion that RPC 5.3 does not require the lawyer to formally employ or retain the nonlawyer.” Moreover, Beasley unquestionably “ratified” the work of the turncoat lawyer by seeking to “use the fruits” of his efforts in this MDL. Legacy communicated with the mediators as intended by Beasley. They even coordinated to the point of authoring articles on mass tort strategy the same day and jointly appearing at a conference. As the court concluded, “Notably, this collaboration was to such an extent that Beasley Allen shared confidential privileged material with Mr. Conlan, deeming him sufficiently associated so as to maintain a privilege over their communications.”

The final issue for the federal court was the balancing of interests. Predictably, Beasley argued that its disqualification would harm its clients. There are, to be sure, many thousands of clients in the MDL. But not all were represented by Beasley, and the other plaintiff law firms appear to be managing just fine without associating with J&J’s former attorneys. In any event, the court did not buy Beasley’s implicit argument that it was too big to fail. Counterbalancing the risks of delay and disruption was “the risk of maintaining the integrity of these proceedings.” Public trust in judicial proceedings is important – more important than the fortunes of an overreaching plaintiff law firm.  “Serious ethical violations warrant serious consequences.” The disqualification here was appropriate.    

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This post is from the non-Reed Smith side of the blog.

They say it’s better to be lucky than good. But in Luckey v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 2026 WL 836122 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 26, 2026), plaintiff was neither.

This is a straightforward—and satisfying—PMA preemption decision involving a heart valve allegedly marketed to last at least 15 years. The device received PMA approval in 2016 and was implanted in plaintiff in 2018. In 2023, after published literature suggested higher-than-expected rates of early structural valve deterioration (“SVD”)—sometimes in five years or less—the manufacturer sent letters to physicians and patients and voluntarily withdrew the product from the market. Plaintiff had his valve explanted in 2024, at which point it showed signs of early SVD. Id. at *1. Suit followed, asserting the usual state law claims: strict liability, negligence, failure to warn, and breach of express and implied warranties. Id. at *2.

Defendant moved to dismiss on preemption grounds. And here’s where things get interesting.

Normally, we would not linger on a court’s recitation of PMA preemption standards as our readers know them well. But this court used a turn of phrase that we think is worth keeping. Instead of just the usual “narrow gap,” the court described the test for stating a non-preempted parallel claim as requiring the state-law claim to “mirror” federal requirements without breaking the “ceiling” of federal law by imposing additional requirements. Id. at *3. We like it. “Gaps” invite creativity; suggest loopholes. “Mirror and ceiling” slam the door.

And slam it the court did.

Plaintiff’s theories boiled down to three alleged violations: (1) failure to report adverse events to the FDA, (2) failure to withdraw the product sooner, and (3) failure to comply with CGMPs. Id. at *5. None survived.

Start with failure to report. Kentucky does not recognize a state-law duty to report adverse events to the FDA. That makes this theory nothing more than a disguised fraud-on-the-FDA claim—squarely impliedly preempted under Buckman. Id. No mirror there.

Next, plaintiff argued the manufacturer should have withdrawn the device sooner. But the withdrawal here was voluntary—not required by the FDA. That distinction matters. If plaintiff’s theory is that the device should have been pulled earlier because adverse events were not properly reported, we are right back in Buckman territory. And if plaintiff is trying to impose a free-standing state-law duty to withdraw, that runs headfirst into express preemption by adding requirements in addition to federal law. Id. The claim crashes right into the ceiling.

The CGMP allegations fared no better. Plaintiff did not allege that his particular valve suffered from a manufacturing defect or quality-control deviation. Instead, he claimed the entire line of valves was defective due to premature SVD. More fundamentally, the court recognized what several courts have before it–CGMPs are high-level, procedural requirements. They “outline procedures,” not specific mandates. They are therefore too vague to support a parallel claim. They also cannot be privately enforced under Buckman. Id. Once again–no mirror, no claim.

Finally, the court addressed the warranty claims. Plaintiff tried to argue that defendant represented the valve would last at least 15 years. But for PMA devices, that argument runs into a hard stop. The FDA controls the labeling. “[E]xpress representations’ relating to a device are limited to the labeling approved by the FDA.” Id. at *7. To the extent plaintiff claims the manufacturer said something more, that necessarily imposes obligations in addition to federal requirements—again breaking the ceiling. Id. at *5, 7. And if the representations are limited to the FDA-approved labeling, then the claim is simply an attack on the adequacy of that labeling, which is also preempted.

In the end, every claim failed the same way: it either did not “mirror” federal requirements or it attempted to push beyond them. Allowing the case to proceed would have required a court or jury to second-guess the FDA’s determinations about safety, reporting, and labeling—precisely what preemption forbids. As the court put it, such claims would “meddle” with or “usurp” the FDA’s role. Id. at *7.

And so, despite his name, plaintiff came up empty. No gap. No mirror. No luck.

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In a pair of decisions, Express Scripts, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County, ___ A.3d ___, 2026 WL 797872 (Md. March 23, 2026), an opioid case, and Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. B.P. P.L.C., ___ A.3d ___, 2026 WL 809501 (Md. March 24, 2025), a climate change case, the Supreme Court of Maryland had definitively shut the door to public nuisance tort litigation as a basis for having courts make what are fundamentally political decisions about the risks and benefits of legally distributed products.  In both, the answer was an emphatic NO!!

We’ll take Express Scripts first, since it’s squarely in the Blog’s sweet spot.

The plaintiffs in Express Scripts sued a bunch of defendants, alleging they were pharmacy benefit managers, mail-order pharmacies and retail pharmacies, and because they were part of the distribution chain for FDA-approved and legally sold opioid pain medicine, they supposedly caused a public nuisance by spurring opioid abuse.  In this litigation, the Maryland federal district court did the right thing and certified the public nuisance question to the MD Supreme Court:

Under Maryland’s common law, can the licensed dispensing of, or administration of benefit plans for, a controlled substance constitute an actionable public nuisance?

Express Scripts, 2026 WL 797872, at *1.  A second question was certified, but the court’s negative answer to #1 mooted it.

Here’s Express Scripts’ short answer to that question:

We answer “no” to the first question.  We hold that the licensed dispensing of, or administration of benefit plans for, a controlled substance does not constitute an actionable public nuisance.  As discussed herein, Maryland’s public nuisance common law has not been expanded beyond the traditional historical principles − namely, that an action for public nuisance brought by a governmental entity on behalf of the public was not regarded as a tort, but instead as a basis for public officials to pursue criminal prosecutions or seek injunctive relief to abate harmful conduct.  Although damages may be available in a private nuisance action (as they were under the common law), this Court has never recognized a government actor’s ability to recover damages in a public nuisance action.

Id. (emphasis added).

The longer answer in Express Scripts is, if anything, even better because – well – it’s longer (43 Westlaw pages), and it comprehensively rejects every argument the plaintiffs made in favor of using public nuisance against manufacturers of legal products.  First off (after spending well over a dozen WL pages describing the statutory and regulatory framework), Express Scripts turned to common-law nuisance.  One interesting tidbit that we didn’t realize is that the Second Restatement formulation of nuisance was an early example of what we have called American Law Institute transforming into “Always Liability Increases.”  The Institute as a whole insisted that the draft not restate the law, as Dean Prosser had attempted to do, but instead put a pro-liability thumb on the scale in favor of “its [public nuisance] use in emerging environmental cases.”  2026 WL 797872, at *20.  In order to “go on record in support of the emergent environmental movement,” a replacement reporter (after Dean Prosser resigned in disgust):

redrafted the definition of public nuisance and substituted the word “unreasonable” for the word “criminal”. . . .  The new definition was adopted in 1972.  With the substitution of a single word, the definition of “public nuisance” underwent a drastic expansion in the Second Restatement.

Id.  Thus, it appears that the ALI has been engaging in its conception of social policy – rather than faithfully restating the law – as a basis for the Torts restatement, for a lot longer than we realized.  The result was “very amorphous, open-ended language” in Restatement (Second) §821B.  2026 WL 797872, at *21.  Even so, “there is nothing in the Second Restatement about public officials recovering damages for a harm to the public generally.”  Id.

Express Scripts discussed Maryland public nuisance precedents − both common-law and statutory − at length, id. at *22-30.  From this extensive discussion Express Scripts drew several “conclusions”:

  • Public nuisance requires “an injury to the public at large” and is not strictly limited to “interfere[nce] with real property.”
  • “[P]rivate nuisance is a tort involving a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.”
  • “[W]e have declined invitations to expand the private nuisance action beyond its traditional common law formulation.”
  • Governmental nuisance actions are “invalid[]” when “(1) the alleged conduct was not a nuisance per se” or “defined as a nuisance by statute or a code; or (2) the enforcement action was . . . arbitrary or unreasonable.”
  • “[N]othing in our case law . . . adopt[s] an expansive tort of public nuisance based upon the [Second Restatement] definition contained in §821B.”
  • It was unprecedented for a “government” to seek “damages for an injury to the public based upon a common public right” – only “injunctive relief” was allowed.

Id. at *33-34.

With that background, Express Scripts refused to expand public nuisance to include Second Restatement-based claims based on allegations of social externalities from legal products.  The court agreed with criticism of that Restatement “for going far beyond the common law.”  Id. at *35 (footnote omitted).  The Second Restatement failed to state what “public nuisance” required beyond “non-exhaustive, open-ended factors” that litigants could use to pursue political objectives.  Id. at *26.  Rather, Express Scripts (like other state high courts) agreed with the Third Restatement:

[W]ith the adoption of the Third Restatement − 48 years after the adoption of the expanded “public nuisance” definition in the Second Restatement − the American Law Institute acknowledges that an expansive common law public nuisance tort is an “inapt vehicle” for a government entity to seek recovery in the form of economic damages arising from products that may create widespread societal concerns. . . .  Comment b to §8 notes that “[a]n action by a public official will commonly lie to abate the nuisance by injunction but may not involve monetary recovery for harm done.”  Notably, the drafters of the Third Restatement address the attempts by government actors to bring tort suits based on public nuisance to recover economic damages for products such as tobacco, firearms, and lead paint.  The comment recognizes that liability based on public nuisance “has been rejected by most courts, and is excluded by this section, because the common law of public nuisance is an inapt vehicle for addressing the conduct at issue.”  Id. §8 cmt. g (emphasis added). The comment explains that “[m]ass harms caused by dangerous products are better addressed through the law of products liability, which has been developed and refined with sensitivity to the various policies at stake.”  Id.  The drafters explain that, if another body of law does “not supply adequate remedies or deterrence,” then “the best response is to address the problems at issue through legislation that can account for all the affected interests.”  Id.

2026 WL 797872, at *36 (emphasis original) (other citations omitted).  Express Scripts agreed that “[t]he Third Restatement reflects a national trend of courts refusing to allow products-based public nuisance claims for economic damages.”  Id. (citing a half-dozen appellate decisions).  Thus, from a public nuisance perspective, the Court stated that it would not loosen the tort of public nuisance pursuant to the expansive provisions in the Second Restatement, and, accordingly, added several important delineations for how the new cases seek to improperly expand the tort:

(1) Harms to individuals, even lots of them, do not involve a public right:

[T]he County’s complaint fails to satisfy a primary requirement of a public nuisance action − namely, that the Defendants’ dispensing of opioids, and administration of benefit plans for opioids, affects a common public right. . . .  No case of this Court has recognized a broad public right to be free from all potential harms associated with the prescribing and dispensing of opioids.

Id. at *37.  The defendants engaged in “lawful” – and, indeed “medically necessary” activities under both federal and Maryland law.  Id. at 39.  They distributed products that were “not unfit for human consumption” and that “d[id] not cause harm to everyone who consumes them.“  Id.

(2) Public nuisance does not apply to the sale of legal products:

[W]e decline to recognize a public right to be free from the adverse effects associated with a lawful product being diverted, misused, or abused.  To recognize a general common law “public right” would permit nuisance liability to be imposed on an endless list of manufacturers, distributors, and retailers of manufactured products that are intended to be used lawfully.

Id. at *40.  The sort of public nuisance liability being proposed would improperly create “a public right so broad and undefined that the presence of any potentially dangerous instrumentality in the community could be deemed to threaten it.”  Id. (quoting one of Bexis’ gun cases).

(3) Public nuisance should defer to regulatory regimes.  Even if all other elements of the tort were met:

[W]e would nonetheless decline to recognize an expanded tort here given the extensive statutory and regulatory framework that governs the conduct. . . .  [C]onduct that is fully authorized by statute, ordinance or administrative regulation does not subject the actor to tort liability. . . .  [A] court should be reluctant to use its equitable powers to impose an injunctive remedy on an activity that is highly regulated by statute. . . .  [T]he distribution of prescription opioids involves a complex subject matter that is a highly regulated activity under both federal and state law.

2026 WL 797872, at *40-41 (citation and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis original).  “[L]itigation should not be used to achieve legislative goals.”  Id. at *41 (again quoting the same gun case).  Thus:

To the extent that the County seeks to impose tort liability for the Defendants’ lawful conduct undertaken pursuant to the federal and state regulatory schemes that authorize the lawful dispensing of opioids and the administration of benefit plans for licensed opioids, Congress and the General Assembly have determined that the social utility of the licensed dispensing of opioids outweighs the gravity of the harm in permitting their lawful dispensing.  We decline to extend tort liability upon the basis of public nuisance where the Legislature has sanctioned the conduct by declaring it to be lawful.

Id. at *42.  As for allegations of “unlawful” conduct, Express Scripts rejected a tort remedy because the “administrative enforcement remedies that are specifically enumerated within the statutory and regulatory scheme” belonged to “agencies entrusted by the Legislature,” not self-appointed plaintiffs, and those agencies “are better suited than judges or juries to determine in the first instance whether highly regulated and complex activity complies with the overlapping federal and state regulations.” Id.

In sum, in Maryland after Express Scripts, product related public nuisance is a bad idea whose time has passed.  “Complex societal problems are best suited for the Legislature, and judicial restraint is the appropriate principle to apply.”  Id.

Overall, the Express Scripts opinion is 43 Westlaw pages long with one concurrence and one concurrence/dissent.  While the concurrence would define public right differently, it still concluded:

[Plaintiff] offers no principle for distinguishing a harm to the public at large from a widespread aggregation of individual injuries.  In other words, [plaintiff’s] conception of a “public right” does not distinguish between a harm that affects everyone at large or everyone that interacts with the nuisance (contaminated drinking water) and harm that is widespread but ultimately affects a subset of the public that encounters the alleged nuisance (opioid consumption).  Without such a distinction, any product that causes sufficient individual harm would give rise to a public nuisance claim − effectively collapsing the boundary between public nuisance and mass tort as well as providing state and local governments boundless enforcement power.

2026 WL 797872, at *44.  The concurrence/dissent would not define ”public right” at all, leaving that to solely the General Assembly.  Id. at *48.

Interestingly, neither the majority nor either of the other two opinions in Express Scripts even so much as mentioned the recent Fourth Circuit opinion in City of Huntington v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., 157 F.4th 547 (4th Cir. 2025) (criticized here).  As Blog readers well know, Huntington “predicted” (based on a couple of trial court opinions) that West Virginia would allow public nuisance in an opioid case.  Well, Maryland is within the Fourth Circuit, and its complete omission of any mention of Huntington – while citing other public nuisance precedent from around the country – looks like a judicial nose-thumb at the Fourth Circuit.  Evidently, no judge in Express Scripts considered Huntington worthy even of being distinguished or criticized.

Finally, while it’s not in our sandbox, we further note that later the same day, the Maryland Supreme Court reached the same conclusion – rejecting a public nuisance cause of action in a case involving legal products (so-called “fossil fuels”) – in the Baltimore v. B.P. climate change case.  Much of the Baltimore v. B.P. decision involved issues (existence of federal common law and preemption) peculiar to federal statutes (the Clean Water and Air Acts) with no applicability to prescription medical product liability litigation.  2026 WL 809501, at *6-25.  Baltimore v. B.P. reiterated that tort liability is not to be used to decide questions best left for the “political branches of government.  Id. at *26.

Baltimore v. B.P. then turned to state-law claims, particularly public nuisance, and reiterated its holdings in Express Scripts:

The [plaintiffs] do not state a claim under Maryland common law for public nuisance. As we discussed in Express Scripts, “Maryland has not expanded the public nuisance doctrine beyond the traditional historical principles embodied in the common law − namely, that a public nuisance action was not regarded as a tort but was instead a public action by a government entity to pursue criminal prosecutions or seek injunctive relief to abate harmful conduct.”  “This Court has never recognized a government entity’s ability to recover damages for public nuisance.”  To the extent that the [plaintiffs] are seeking damages for public nuisance, such recovery exceeds the bounds of Maryland’s public nuisance doctrine.  Moreover, . . . we . . . decline to expand Maryland’s common law of public nuisance to govern the conduct alleged . . . “given the extensive federal . . . statutory and regulatory framework that governs [this subject]. . . .  Where the legislature has, through the enactment of comprehensive legislation, entrusted such highly complex matters to an agency having expertise of the same, we decline to expand common law nuisance to address the same conduct.

2026 WL 809501, at *28 (Express Scripts citations omitted).  Further, climate change public nuisance litigation was simply absurd – the apotheosis of judicial triumphalism (the notion that litigation can solve everything):

[T]he notion that a local government . . . may pursue state law nuisance claims against the Defendants − seeking . . . to abate injuries arising from global greenhouse effects arising from worldwide conduct − is so far afield from any area of traditional state or local responsibility that it cannot be seriously contemplated.

Id. at *29 (emphasis added).

We have been fighting to prevent public nuisance from intruding on product liability ever since the theory (in its modern formulation) first reared its ugly head in firearms litigation nearly thirty years ago.  To us, the claim that purported state law could ever declare that the manufacturing and marketing of FDA-approved products for their FDA-approved uses is a “public nuisance” is ridiculous.  We are thrilled that yet another state high court has agreed with us.

We wish to acknowledge that parts of this blogpost were adapted (or plagiarized) from an excellent summary of the Express Scripts decision that we received from Phil Goldberg of Shook Hardy, who filed an amicus brief in that case.

Finally, the title of this post comes from a line in “Maryland My Maryland,” a borderline treasonous Civil War era song that was once the Maryland state anthem.

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If you do the kind of law that we on the Blog do, you don’t want to miss this. Registration for the 2026 DRI Drug and Medical Device Seminar is officially open, and Early Bird pricing disappears on April 6. Waiting means paying more, up to $700 more, for the exact same experience. If this seminar is on your radar, now is the moment to lock in your spot.

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We’re not bashful about our affinity for real science. It underpins our clients’ ability to develop life-saving drugs and devices, supports Rule 702’s role in keeping junk science out of courtrooms, and reflects the skeptical habits of mind that should matter to everyone. Shortly before his death in 1996, Carl Sagan discussed with Charlie Rose the dangers of a society where fundamental understandings of science and technology continue to diminish:

There [are] two kinds of dangers. One is . . . [t]hat we’ve arranged a society based on science and technology in which nobody understands anything about science and technology, and this combustible mixture of ignorance and power, sooner or later, is going to blow up in our faces. I mean, who is running the science and technology in a democracy if the people don’t know anything about it? And the second reason that I’m worried about this is that science is more than a body of knowledge. It’s a way of thinking. A way of skeptically interrogating the universe with a fine understanding of human fallibility. If we are not able to ask skeptical questions, to interrogate those who tell us that something is true, to be skeptical of those in authority, then we’re up for grabs for the next charlatan political or religious who comes ambling along. It’s a thing that Jefferson laid great stress on. It wasn’t enough, he said, to enshrine some rights in a Constitution or a Bill of Rights. The people had to be educated, and they had to practice their skepticism and their education.

Carl Sagan’s Last Interview. Fast forward, and today we’re discussing a case where the court quotes Carl Sagan and notes that, in the context of vaccines, science is “the best we have.”  Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Kennedy, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2026 WL 733828 (D. Mass. Mar. 16, 2026).  Through a combination of good science and government oversight, the United States’ vaccination program has been a beacon for public health: 

Congress and the Executive have built—over decades—an apparatus that marries the rigors of science with the execution and force of the United States government. One extraordinary product of that apparatus has been the eradication and reduction of certain communicable diseases through the development and use of vaccines.  In the words of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), vaccines are one of the greatest achievements of biomedical science and public health.

Id. at *1 (cleaned up).  That success in the eradication of certain diseases is based on a rigorous method by which decisions about vaccine policy are made—“a method scientific in nature and codified into law through procedural requirements.” Id.  In this case, that rigorous and well-established method (both scientific and legal) was ignored.

Continue Reading Injunction Granted against Revised Childhood Vaccination Schedule and Wholesale Reconstitution of Vaccine Advisory Committee
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Navigating the FDA’s website can pose challenges.  Search functionality is iffy, data can be buried on unexpected sub-pages, and there just is a lot of material there.

Adverse event report information historically has been spread across six systems:

  • FAERS (FDA Adverse Event Reporting System) — containing reports for drugs, biologics, cosmetic products, and color additives. 
  • VAERS (Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System) — containing reports for vaccines (co-managed by FDA and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). 
  • AERS (Adverse Event Reporting System) — two databases containing reports for animal drugs and animal foods. 
  • MAUDE (Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience) — containing reports for medical devices.
  • HFCS (Human Foods Complaint System) — containing reports for human foods and dietary supplements. 
  • CTPAE (Center for Tobacco Products Adverse Event Reporting System) — containing reports for Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems (ENDS) and other tobacco products.

By end of May, all of these adverse event reporting systems will be shut down, and adverse event information will be wrapped up into a single “Adverse Event Monitoring System” or “AEMS”.  The FDA’s press release is here.  The new public dashboard is here (but the device, food, and tobacco portions are not yet operational). 

According to the website, AEMS will cover more than adverse events, serving “as a centralized platform for managing consumer complaints, regulatory misconduct reports, and whistleblower submissions across all FDA centers.” 

For our drug and device litigation purposes, the new system contains useful express caveats about the use (or mis-use) of adverse event information.  The dashboard landing page starts it off by stating: 

AEMS Data Limitations

While the FDA AEMS Public Dashboard offers stakeholders many more ways of searching for and organizing data on adverse events reported to the FDA, there remain limitations to the data. For example, while AEMS contains reports on a particular drug or biologic, this does not mean that the drug or biologic caused the adverse event. Importantly, the AEMS data by themselves are not an indicator of the safety profile of a product. Some additional limitations to note include:

1. Duplicate and incomplete reports are in the system: There are many instances of duplicative reports and some reports do not contain all the necessary information.

2. Existence of a report does not establish causation: For any given report, there is no certainty that a suspected product caused the event. While consumers and healthcare professionals are encouraged to report adverse events, the event may have been related to the underlying disease being treated, or caused by some other drug being taken concurrently, or occurred for other reasons. The information in these reports reflects only the reporter’s observations and opinions.

3. Information in reports has not been verified: Submission of a report does not mean that the information included in it has been confirmed nor it is an admission from the reporter that the product caused or contributed the event.

4. Rates of occurrence cannot be established with reports: The information in these reports cannot be used to estimate the incidence (occurrence rates) of the events reported.

5. Patients should talk to their doctor before stopping or changing how they take their medications.

    Even better, to access AEMS, a user has to affirmatively accept the terms outlined in a pop-up disclaimer, which reads as follows (with some emphasis added):

    Disclaimer

    Each year, the FDA receives over two million adverse event and medication error reports associated with the use of drugs and biologic products. The FDA uses these reports to monitor the safety of drug and biologic products through the FDA Adverse Event Monitoring System (AEMS) database, which houses reports submitted by drug manufacturers (who are required to submit these reports) as well as healthcare professionals and consumers. It is important to note that submission of a safety report does not constitute an admission that medical personnel, user facility, importer, distributor, manufacturer, or product caused or contributed to the event.

    Although these reports provide valuable information, this surveillance system has inherent limitations. Reports may contain incomplete, inaccurate, untimely, and/or unverified information. Additionally, the true incidence or prevalence of an event cannot be determined from this reporting system alone due to potential under-reporting and lack of information about frequency of use. Because of these limitations, AEMS data comprise only one component of the FDA’s comprehensive post-market surveillance program, and the information does not confirm a causal relationship between the drug or biologic product and the reported adverse event(s).

    American public (or consumers) should be aware of several important considerations when interpreting AEMS data.

    – Consumers should not stop or change medication without first consulting with a health care professional.

    – AEMS data alone cannot be used to establish event rates, evaluate changes in event rates over time, or compare event rates between products.

    – The number of reports cannot be interpreted in isolation to reach conclusions about the existence, severity, or frequency of problems associated with drug products.

    – Confirming whether a drug product caused a specific event can be difficult based solely on information provided in each report.

    – Therefore, AEMS data should be interpreted in the context of other available information when making drug or biologic-related treatment decisions.

    The AEMS web search feature covers adverse event reports from 1968 to present, with data submitted to AEMS made available daily (near real-time) through the online querying tool. However, variations in trade, product, and company names affect search results, as searches only retrieve records containing the specific search terms provided. Safety reports submitted to FDA do not necessarily reflect a conclusion by FDA that the information constitutes an admission that the drug or biologic caused or contributed to an adverse event.

    Because AEMS users have to accept the disclaimer terms to access data, any plaintiff-side expert who attempts to rely on adverse event data to support causation opinions will be vulnerable to cross-examination about how they explicitly acknowledged that adverse event reports “may contain incomplete, inaccurate, untimely, and/or unverified information” and “[do] not confirm a causal relationship between the drug or biologic product and the reported adverse event(s).”

    Hopefully, this pop-up disclaimer language will be updated soon to include more than just “drug or biologic” products as AEMS will cover medical devices and vaccines as well. 

    But we appreciate its inclusion, and that assent is required for access.  It won’t end plaintiffs’ experts from misusing adverse event data, but it does give us good fodder for cross and the Rule 702 motions that follow.

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    Kansas has given us many great people and institutions. We Philadelphians are particularly grateful for Darren Daulton, the late, great Phillies catcher. We have also enjoyed the work of Charlie Parker, Buster Keaton, and, of course, Dorothy Gale. Further, the Kansas college basketball team is perennially very good. (But that was a tough loss last Sunday to St. John’s. And someone surprised us with the fact that Bill Self’s team has not made it through the first weekend of the NCAA tournament in four years. Yikes.) We especially esteem Kansas because it has not shown up on any Hellhole list that we have seen. Its courts are almost always sane. 

    Minshew v. Krumme, 2026 WL 759033 (D. Kansas March 18, 2026), is a purported class action alleging non-sterile conditions in Kansas and Missouri operating rooms. The plaintiffs sued a series of doctors and medical institutions, alleging that the defendants performed surgeries with unsterile tools and thereby caused the plaintiffs to sustain infections. The complaint contained causes of action for negligence, negligence per se, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of express contract, breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment, violation of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act, medical malpractice, and fraud.  The plaintiffs filed the case in state court, but the defendants removed it to federal court. The defendants then filed motions to dismiss. Most of the causes of action were dismissed.  

    Why should you care? 

    One part of the decision is relevant to product liability claims.  That is the dismissal of the negligence per se claim under Kansas law.  In Kansas, as in many other states, negligence per se is limited “to violations of a statute for which the legislature intended to create a private cause of action.”  The cite is to the Brooks favorable Tenth Circuit FDA medical device preemption decision.  The FDCA was not at issue here, but analogous federal and Kansas regulations were.  The plaintiffs claimed that defendants violated federal Medicare regulations and state hospital licensing regulations.  

    Kansas courts deploy a two-part test to determine whether a private right of action is created: (1) the party must show that the statute was designed to protect a specific group of people rather than protect the general public; and (2) the court must review legislative history to see whether a private right of action was intended. (Justice Scalia would have frowned at the last bit.)

    The problem for the plaintiff in Minshew is that none of the regulations or underlying laws at issue reflected any intent to provide a private cause of action.  Because enacting bodies (Congress for Medicare and the Kansas legislature for the enabling statute for the state regs) did not intend a private right of action, the negligence per se claims failed.  The state statute had been amended several times and the legislature had never included any private action.  Moreover, Kansas appellate courts generally will not infer a private right of action where a statute provides criminal penalties but does not mention civil liability. That was the situation here. 

    The federal Medicare regulations at issue did not confer any private right of action. The plaintiff could not evade that obstacle by relying on the Medicare as Secondary Payor (MSP) statute. First, the MSP facially did not apply to the allegations of the complaint. Second, the MSP shows that Congress knew how to create a private action had it so desired — and it did not do so for the statutes that supposedly supported the plaintiff’s claims here. 

    This result fits into one of the “defenses to negligence per se” that Bexis blogged about way back in 2007. Plaintiffs in prescription medical product liability litigation frequently claim negligence per se as to purported FDCA violations.  Fight back. With Minshew and other cases, we defense hacks have plenty of ammunition. 

    The plaintiffs tried to save the negligence per se claim by pointing to Missouri regulations, as well as the Kansas regulations. But Kansas choice of law principles do not allow depecage (the application of the law of different states to different issues within the same claim), so the effort to drive the case over the state line did not work. 

    The rest of the opinion is not especially blogworthy because the dismissals, or non-dismissals, are mostly related to medical malpractice peculiarities. The court did clean things up considerably (appropriate when cleanliness was the main issue) by holding that the plaintiffs’ “negligence and medical-malpractice claims subsume their claims for fraud, breach of implied and express contract, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty.”

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    Today’s case, Kouyate v. L. Perrigo Company, 2026 WL 591874 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 3, 2026), is the latest entry in the ever-growing pile of meritless benzene OTC class actions. This time, the target is acne treatments containing benzoyl peroxide (BPO), with the now-familiar allegation that BPO degrades into benzene during storage and shipping. If that sounds familiar, it should. Back in October, we covered dismissal of this very plaintiff’s nearly identical lawsuit against a different manufacturer. Then, we suggested that despite a steady stream of preemption dismissals, more of these cases were likely on the way. Not only were we right, but here we have the same plaintiff trying again in a different court against a different defendant. At some point, the definition of insanity starts to feel less like a cliché and more like a litigation strategy.

    In this new installment, defendant moved to dismiss on both preemption and standing grounds. Standing survived. Preemption did not. And, in a bit of poetic symmetry, plaintiff’s standing theory helped seal the fate of his claims.

    On standing, defendant argued that plaintiff’s alleged injury was hypothetical as opposed to “actual or imminent.” He never tested the products he purchased and instead relied on the presence of benzene found in generalized testing of BPO products. Normally, that sort of leap doesn’t clear the Article III hurdle. But here, the court accepted plaintiff’s allegation that defendant “always manufactured, stored and transported the Products in the same manner,” which was enough to infer “widespread or extensive contamination.” Id. at *3-4.

    That was enough—for standing purposes. But that same allegation created a preemption problem plaintiff could not escape.

    For OTC drugs, the FDCA expressly preempts all state court claims that impose requirements “different from or in addition to” federal requirements. 21 U.S.C. §379r(a). Here, those federal requirements are set out in the FDA’s monograph, dictating what goes on the label and what warnings are required. Therefore, claims that the product should have been designed differently or labeled with additional warnings would impose requirements “different from or in addition to” federal law and are expressly preempted. Plaintiff tried several familiar detours around that roadblock—all hinging on allegations that defendant’s labeling and sale of its products violated FDA regulations.

    First, he argued the product was “adulterated” because benzene is a “decomposed substance” prohibited by general FDCA regulations. Id. at *8. The court was not persuaded. In context, the statutory language—paired with terms like “filthy” and “putrid”—targets organic decomposition, not the sort of chemical breakdown alleged here. Benzene, in other words, is not that kind of “decomposed substance.”

    Next came misbranding. Plaintiff claimed the label failed to disclose that the product might be dangerous due to the presence of benzene. But monograph compliance forecloses that argument. A product that satisfies the FDA’s labeling requirements is not misbranded simply because a plaintiff disagrees with the agency’s safety determination. Id. Recasting the argument as one about manufacturing, storage, and shipping conditions did not help. Plaintiff never identified any specific practices that supposedly caused degradation. Instead, he alleged that degradation occurs under “normal conditions”—the very conditions the FDA presumably considered when approving BPO for OTC use. That theory runs headlong into the FDA’s conclusion that these products are safe and effective. Id.

    Which brings us to the most interesting twist–plaintiff’s standing theory comes back to haunt him. To establish standing, plaintiff needed to allege that benzene formation is widespread—essentially inevitable under ordinary conditions—so the court could infer it was present in the products he bought. But to avoid preemption, plaintiff needed to argue the opposite: that benzene formation depends on atypical, manufacturer-specific conditions and doesn’t undermine the FDA’s safety determination. The court wasn’t persuaded that plaintiff could have it both ways. If degradation is universal, then the claims challenge the FDA’s conclusion that BPO is safe. If it’s not universal, then plaintiff’s standing theory falls apart. Id. at *9. Pick your poison. Either way, the claims don’t survive.

    Plaintiff’s remaining arguments fared no better. Plaintiff’s claim that the products were mislabeled for failing to list benzene as an inactive ingredient failed because benzene is not an “inactive ingredient” under FDA definitions. It is, at most, an unintended byproduct. Id. at*9-10. And the attempt to recast the case as one about CGMP violations went nowhere, because those allegations still rested on the same core theory that conflicts with the FDA’s monograph determination. Id. at *10. CGMPs are not a back door around preemption when the front door is firmly shut.

    So, despite clearing the low bar the court set for standing, the case ultimately met the same fate as its predecessors–dismissal on preemption grounds. So where does that leave us? Right where we were in October. Watching these benzene OTC class actions pile up—and pile out. The theory has not changed. The result has not changed. And yet the filings keep coming. For now, at least, the preemption wall is holding—but we are not betting that we have seen the last attempt to run straight into it.

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    Scott v. Amazon.com, Inc., ___ P.3d ___, 2026 WL 468578 (Wash. Feb. 19, 2026), is one of those decisions that makes us go hmmm.  Here’s why.

    Scott involves very unfortunate facts, four people who, in separate incidents, committed suicide using the same chemical, which they all allegedly purchased using the defendant’s online sales platform.  Id. at *1.  So far, so bad.  But it’s the other alleged facts – which had to be taken as true on a pleadings-based motion to dismiss – that make the Scott decision so palpably wrong (at least to us; it was a unanimous decision).  Those facts – alleged by the plaintiffs themselves –leave us scratching our heads about how there could conceivably be liability.

    • The chemical at issue, while a deadly poison at high concentrations, has legitimate uses, being “used in laboratories for research and medical purposes” and “in meat preservation.”  2026 WL 468578, at *1.
    • All of the decedents were determined to use it to commit suicide and did so within a few days or at most weeks of receiving it.  Id.
    • At least some, maybe all, of the decedents visited online “suicide forums.”  Id. at *2.  There were no allegations that the defendant had anything to do with those forums.
    • At least some, maybe all, of the decedents, consulted “a suicide instruction book that devotes a chapter to lethal inorganic salts, which contains instructions on how to use [the chemical] to die by suicide.”  Id.
    • The “suicide instruction book” told the decedents that the chemical was “readily available online and provide[d] a hyperlink to the [chemical]  products on the [defendant’s] webpage.”  Id.
    • One of the decedents also bought a “small scale” to make ensure he used enough.  Another also bought a prescription drug “that suicide forums recommend purchasing to prevent life-saving vomiting that occurs when [the chemical] is ingested.”  Id.

    Note:  unlike the Scott opinion, we neither identify the chemical nor provide the title of suicide manual.

    In sum, the pleadings in Scott established that these decedents, for whatever unfortunate reasons, were bound and determined to kill themselves.  They researched and planned how to do it, carried out their plans, and succeeded.  If that isn’t superseding cause (and maybe in pari delicto) as a matter of law, we don’t know what would be.

    But Scott in its infinite judicial wisdom, held that these allegations stated a claim − the plaintiffs’ decedents’ deliberate and sustained intent to kill themselves notwithstanding.  First, Scott held that intentional suicide was no longer ipso facto a superseding cause:

    Plaintiffs alleged . . . that the decedents’ suicide risk was known to [defendant] prior to the negligent act complained of . . . which creates a duty to safeguard the four decedents from the foreseeable consequence of its existence. . . .  Taking the facts Plaintiffs have alleged as true, we are unable to say, as a matter of law, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the decedents’ deaths were not proximately caused by [defendant’s] alleged tortious sales practices of the [chemical].  The rule . . . that the act of suicide is a superseding cause as a matter of law does not control here. We hold that the act of suicide, as a matter of law, is not a superseding cause.

    Id. at *5 (citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).  “Beyond a reasonable doubt”?  Since when do defendants have to meet a criminal standard of proof to establish superseding cause?

    Okay, we grant that jurisprudential arguments exist that cut both ways on suicide in the abstract.  But Scott was anything but abstract.  Consider the pleaded facts.  If this isn’t superseding cause as a matter of law, what could be?  (1) The decedents frequented suicide-related internet forums.  (2) They consulted a book that told them specifically what to use and where to buy it.  (3) The defendant did not run the forums nor write the book.  (4) The decedents were directed by the sites and the book to use this chemical, and how much of it was necessary.  (5) The book told the decedents where they could buy it.  (6) The book told the decedents they could buy a prescription drug to suppress the body’s ability to resist the poison through vomiting.  (7) Tragically, the decedents followed these instructions and achieved the result they were seeking – to kill themselves.

    Perhaps some suicides might not be superseding causes.  See Id. at *5 (relying on a case about a hospital that “actually” knew of a “foreseeable” risk by a specific individual”).  These people, however, were internet purchasers, not individually known individuals.  So the upshot of Scott appears to be an indiscriminate duty owed to the entire world (“every individual has a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid the foreseeable consequences and harm from their acts,” including “ exposing another to harm from the foreseeable conduct of a third party”).  Id. at *5 (citations and quotation marks omitted).  We can see no way, short of banning sale of this chemical – again one with legitimate uses – to have prevented its use by these determined decedents.  Indeed, Scott hints that this may be the opening salvo for judicially imposed product bans.  Id. at *6 (rejecting argument against “allow[ing] juries to legislate whether a well-made product should not be sold because of potential misuse”) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. id. at *10, 13 (concurring opinion stating that the defendant “never restricted . . . sales to adults or to commercial buyers” and indicating that sale for “household use” should be banned).  We have always believed that banning products should be a legislative, not judicial, act.

    Even more concerning (if possible) is that Scott waved through a warning-based claim.  See Id. at *2 (describing plaintiffs’ allegations that the defendant’s website had “no warnings or descriptions of the product . . . visible to customers” and “no warnings to consumers about how deadly the product is or how to reverse its effects”).  Okay, we’ll take all those facts as true.  Then what?

    The decedents here were deliberately trying to kill themselves.  They already knew from suicide websites and a suicide manual that the product would kill them if they used X amount of it.  What warning would have stopped them?  Putting a skull and crossbones symbol or a “deadly poison” label on the product would only have encouraged them further.  Moreover, the decedents didn’t want to “reverse its effects” (except maybe when it was too late) – they bought a separate drug to prevent that.  Nor was there any indication that any emergency responder didn’t know how to respond (assuming success was ever possible).

    Our blog is directed, first and foremost, to the defense of prescription medical product liability litigation.  Scott is concerning because, while it involved a chemical, many prescription and OTC drugs can be deadly in the event of an overdose – whether accidental or intentional.  Will plaintiffs mount the same over-the-top absolute liability allegations in prescription medical product liability litigation?  Probably, but we doubt they will succeed, any more than with the SSRI suicide cases being litigated when we first started blogging.  First, prescription medical products are just that; they require a physician’s prescription, whether bought in a store or over the internet.  Scott did not have to address the learned intermediary rule.  Second, Scott involved a direct seller, not a product manufacturer.  That’s another layer of protection.  Third, and perhaps most important, both prescription medical products and OTC drugs (and their labeling) must be FDA approved.  States cannot ban, through litigation or otherwise, products that have been federally approved for marketing nationwide.  E.g., Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 488-49 (2013) (see our post here, collecting stop selling preemption cases).

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