Yes, we are the Drug and Device Law Blog. Yes, we at times stray into other areas when we think a decision has application to our DDL world. Yes, today’s case is about a “drug” product. No, today’s case is not about a drug for humans. In fact, it really isn’t about a drug at
Illinois
The Intersection of Telehealth, Privacy, and Medical Devices

One good thing that occurred during the pandemic was the expansion of telehealth. Telehealth existed already and probably would have been expanding anyway, but patient willingness to get care from home instead of risking exposure from an in-person visit paired well with provider interest in not going to or even having to maintain an office. …
N.D. Illinois Holds that Natural Water Class Action is all Wet

One of the break-through moments in the first year of law school is when your Contracts professor distinguishes actionable promises from mere “puffery.” Not every statement invites reliance. You cannot take every statement by a seller literally. The concept of non actionable puffery is the law’s way of telling us to grow up, to get…
Is Human Tissue A Product?

We don’t see many cases involving human tissue, but medical products derived from human tissue are actually quite common. Skin replacement products, tissue-engineered cartilage, compounds for treating bone fractures and tumors. Those kinds of things. Just yesterday in our annual Ten Best/Ten Worst Cases webinar we discussed a case involving transplanted human eye tissue. …
Reporter’s Privilege Protects JAMA Peer-Review Documents from Discovery

The legal doctrine we discuss today, the reporter’s privilege, lies outside our traditional bailiwick but is worth a quick visit. Recognized in most states, the reporter’s privilege—also known as the journalist’s or newsman’s privilege—is an absolute or conditional “protection, under constitutional or statutory law, from being compelled to testify about confidential information or sources.” Black’s…
Cold Remedy/Vitamin C Convenience Pack is Not Deceptive

Lately, there seems to be an overdose of OTC (Over the Counter) drug cases. Everywhere we look, we see more and more lawsuits centered on OTC’s, both in the areas of product liability and consumer fraud. Is it because OTC litigation offers plaintiff lawyers the prospect of a huge potential plaintiff population? Is it because…
PMA Preemption Decision Slides to the Bottom of the “Parallel Claim” Slippery Slope

Back in 2008, the United States Supreme Court held, in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008), that essentially all product liability claims against manufacturers of FDA pre-market approved (“PMA”) medical devices were preempted. After all, PMA “is in no sense an exemption from federal safety review − it is federal safety review.” Id. at 323. Thus, by a 7-2 margin the Court held, per Justice Scalia, that all state-law liability claims before it – “strict liability; breach of implied warranty; and negligence in the [product’s] design, testing, inspection, distribution, labeling, marketing, and sale,” id. at 320 – were expressly preempted:Continue Reading PMA Preemption Decision Slides to the Bottom of the “Parallel Claim” Slippery Slope
Plaintiffs’ “Misleading Marketing and Labeling” Claims Thrown Out in N.D. Ill. Popcorn Case

Today’s case is not about drugs or medical devices. It is about popcorn, a perfect prompt (or as good as ours ever get) for a rant about movies. We are working our way through the Oscar nominees, in anticipation of the upcoming Academy Awards. (Pre-apocalypse, we hosted an annual Oscar party, featuring good food, good…
Fallacious FDA Reporting Claim Finally Falls

Product liability litigation over Class III medical devices is an interesting creature. Absent something unusual, cases and litigations should not get past motions to dismiss. That is pretty clearly what Congress intended when an express preemption provision was added to the Medical Device Amendments of 1976. We understand that each plaintiff may think her case is exceptional in that it should meet the exception to the rule of preemption. (We do not really think the plaintiff lawyers think that, although they sure argue it enough.) But the usual is more common than the unusual by definition. When you hear hoof beats, you should look for a horse not a zebra, unless you happen to be in a part of the world where zebras are endemic or end up in a zebra enclosure in a zoo. When you hear Class III medical device product liability case, you should look for all claims to be dismissed unless there is something as unusual as a basis to claiming the plaintiff’s particular device deviated from its FDA-approved specifications.
In 2001, the Supreme Court made getting past motions to dismiss harder when it held in Buckman that plaintiffs could not recover claims predicated on violations of FDA regulations. An unfortunate fiction developed post-Buckman—particularly after Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. 552 U.S. 312 (2008)—that plaintiffs could assert “parallel claims” that were neither expressly preempted by the provisions of the MDA nor impliedly preempted under Buckman. We, and others, have described the purported path of a parallel claim as being like navigating between Scylla and Charybdis, a monster and whirlpool on opposite sides of a narrow strait per ancient Greek mythology. Without claiming that mythology is the same as fiction—we are not touching that with a twenty foot sarissa—we can say that a true parallel claim is as rare as a striped unicorn or perhaps a flying horse. The unfortunate fiction of which we spoke above has taken shape with particularly egregious appellate decisions like Bausch such that some trial courts are advised, when they hear the hoof beat of a Class III medical device product liability case, to expect Pegasus or his stripy, horned pal to gallop around the corner.
Viewed over the course of more than five years and many decisions, three of which have featured in prior posts (here, here, and here, which drew honorable mention honors in 2018), we think Bausch delayed the inevitable in Gravitt v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC, __ F.Supp.3d __, 2022 WL 17668486 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2022), by insisting that parallel claims for failure to report adverse events to FDA exist. After an unnecessary odyssey, the manufacturer of a Class III breast implant won summary judgment on the last of plaintiffs’ claims, alleged failure to report adverse events to FDA. (We say “plaintiffs,” but the decision referred to the plaintiff with the implant—who we will call the “plaintiff”—by her first name and the consortium plaintiff by his first name. In terms of whether the last claim was supported, the court referred the female plaintiff only and somehow omitted any reference to “burden.” These are usually signs that at least one claim will survive summary judgment.) A shout out to Dustin Rawlin and his colleagues for sticking it out on this case and sending us this decision.Continue Reading Fallacious FDA Reporting Claim Finally Falls
Five Strikes Needed To Dismiss A Questionable Case

Drug manufacturers are not insurers against injury from or while taking medications. Neither are distributors or pharmacies. Just because a patient experiences a complication while taking a medication, including the very condition the medication is supposed to help prevent, does not mean that some person or entity should be liable to the patient for her injuries. Sometimes, there is no fault or liability to be found. We do not think these are controversial principles, but we find that they apply to more than a few of the cases giving rise to the decisions about which we expound.
We also find that missing facts from complaints can speak volumes. Similarly, when a plaintiff waits until the third complaint to add case-specific factual allegations that should have been there from the start or when factual allegations pop in and out of serial amendments you have to question the basis for those allegations. At least we do. As inveterate curmudgeons, we tend to think bare-bones, boilerplate allegations are unlikely to be supported if the case gets to the merits. Of course, part of the game for some plaintiffs is to get past pleadings and hope the defendants opt for settlement instead of paying the costs of defense. The Twombly and Iqbal decisions tightened pleading standards, and thus improved the chance of success on motions to dismiss in federal court and some states have followed along. The hole, and source of our periodic grumbling, is how often dismissals are without prejudice and accompanied by leave to amend. Too often, it seems that the provision in Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 that courts “should freely give leave when justice so requires” leads to leave even when it should be obvious that amendment will be futile, not to mention a waste of judicial resources.Continue Reading Five Strikes Needed To Dismiss A Questionable Case