Not too long ago one of our bloggers (McConnell) critiqued a p-side law review article he had received from a lawyer on the other side with whom he was friendly. Bexis isn’t as friendly with opposing counsel – Paul Rheingold being a rare exception. But probably due to his activity in the American Law Institute, law professors on occasion have asked Bexis to review a law review article or two. The articles are usually pro-plaintiff, as are most law professors.
Bexis can be a glutton for punishment – but knowing and being prepared to respond to what the other side might throw at us has some value.
Anyway, the article is by Luke Meier, a professor at Baylor Law School, who admittedly is at the plaintiffs’ end of the legal spectrum when it comes to prescription medical product liability litigation:
On one end of the spectrum is the notion that pharmaceutical defendants should be strictly liable (that is, liable even though the product was not defective) for injuries caused by their products. I happen to fall into this camp. . . .
L. Meier, “Failure-to-Warn Suits Against Pharmaceutical Companies: Physician Testimony, Causation, & Summary Judgment,” at p.46 (emphasis added). It’s available here, although we caution that it doesn’t at all look like a finished product. There are loads of citation-related typos and inconsistencies, a totally unattributed block quote (p.37), and a humorous “disinterred witness” typo that just happens to be in a hypothetical about shoveling (p. 42). The article’s treatment of the law, however, is in no sense humorous.
Before it gets to its main thesis, however, the article makes some “background” points we can agree with. Concerning manufacturing defects, “it is extremely rare for a pharmaceutical company to allow a product that has not been manufactured correctly to enter the market” (p.6 (footnote omitted)). Concerning design defect claims, the article recognizes that “[p]ractically speaking, a plaintiff has very little chance of winning a design defect suit against a pharmaceutical manufacturer” (p.10 (footnote omitted)). We agree, although with respect to design defect claims, our primary reason is not the common-law quirks that the article addresses, but rather preemption. As the Supreme Court has recognized, “[o]nce a drug − whether generic or brand-name − is approved, the manufacturer is prohibited from making any major changes to the ‘qualitative or quantitative formulation of the drug product, including active ingredients, or in the specifications provided in the approved application.’” Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472 (2013) (citation omitted). The FDCA’s “major change” category extends to anything that could cause the type of injuries involved in product liability litigation – as we’ve discussed many times, such as here.
Thus the article pushes informationally based “warning” liability as a plaintiff’s last, best hope. The learned intermediary rule (in addition to preemption in many cases) stands in the way of the author’s pro-liability point of view, so it must somehow be neutered. How does the article propose to do that? By ignoring the time-honored requirement that a tort plaintiff has the burden of proving causation, to start. “Burden of proof” appears exactly once in this 47-page article, in a footnote quotation from one of Bexis’ favorite cases. Meier Article p. 20 n.147.
The traditional tort burden of proof in a warning case requires the plaintiff to establish, with affirmative facts, that a different warning would have prevented his or her claimed injury. In non-learned-intermediary situations, the person being warned is the plaintiff, so the plaintiff is his or her own primary witness to establish what we call “warning causation.” Thus, extremely self-interested plaintiffs can be expected to testify to whatever is necessary to establish a prima facie warning causation case. The article acknowledges that, in some jurisdictions, plaintiffs receive the benefit of a “heeding presumption” (something we have long detested) in warning cases, but dismisses the presumption as “weak” in learned intermediary rule cases because the same affirmative evidence that defeats causation under the learned intermediary rule also rebuts this presumption (p. 8). See also Beck & Vale, Drug & Medical Liability Deskbook §2.05[4], at 2.05-92-97 (updated 2024) (discussing ways to rebut a heeding presumption). That is also true.
What’s critically different in a learned intermediary situation is essentially the reason for this article. Causation testimony does not come from an interested plaintiff. Ironically, the article spends significant ink attacking the “credibility” of medical professionals, Meier Article pp. 3-4, 38-39, whereas the plaintiffs themselves – who would have to testify to causation if the learned intermediary rule were somehow disabled – get a free pass despite their far worse credibility problems.
Under the learned intermediary rule, to prove causation, evidence must exist that, if believed by the finder of fact, an additional warning would have made some change (often defined as not prescribing the product) in the prescribing physician’s treatment of the patient that would have prevented the injury. The plaintiff bears the burden of coming forward with such evidence. But the physician is ordinarily independent and thus not beholden to the plaintiff. So the plaintiff must obtain warning causation evidence to meet the burden of proof from a witness whose testimony may well be adverse. If the plaintiff does not, then s/he fails to meet the applicable burden of proof. If the plaintiff does, then usually disputed issues of fact exist, and the case goes to trial. The article criticizes that as “asymmetrical risk” (pp.26-27) and “presum[ing] causation is lacking” (p. 30), but that is simply how summary judgment works in the adversary system – requiring the party bearing the burden of proof to meet that burden before a trial is warranted. The party with the burden of proof must come forward with evidence, not allegations and not speculation. It’s that simple.
Several types of physician testimony will leave the plaintiff without facts sufficient to meet the usual burden of establishing the possibility of materially different treatment, thus entitling the defendant to summary judgment. These are compiled in Bexis’ book (and often on the blog as well). Here are the most common warning causation roadblocks in learned intermediary rule causation cases:
- The prescribing physician never read the allegedly inadequate warning. Bexis’ book §2.05[2], at pp. 2.05-35 to -40; blogpost.
- The prescribing physician testified that s/he already knew the information omitted from the allegedly inadequate warning. Id. §2.05[2], at pp. 2.05-18 to -29; blogpost.
- The prescribing physician testified that, even had s/he received the warning the plaintiff demands, s/he would have done nothing differently. Id. §2.05[2], at pp. 2.05-43 to -48; blogpost.
- The prescribing physician did not consider the risk severe enough to affect the prescription decision. Id. §2.05[2], at pp. 2.05-41 to -42; blogpost.
- The prescribing physician testified that, after the plaintiff was injured s/he did not change any relevant treatment protocols. Id. §2.05[2], at pp. 2.05-1 to -3.
- There is no evidence at all concerning the prescriber, either because s/he was never deposed or s/he had died, and there is no heeding presumption to flip the burden of proof. Id. §2.05[2], at pp. 2.05-53 to -57; blogpost.
- Further, it is hardly impossible for plaintiffs to establish warning causation under the learned intermediary rule, as the numerous citations to summary judgment denials in Bexis’ book demonstrate. Id. §2.05[3], at pp. 2.05-69 to -78.
Thus, the law on learned intermediary causation is exactly as stated in Bexis’ book:
In a learned intermediary case, it is “well settled” that a manufacturer’s inadequate warning is causal only if a different warning would have changed the physician’s (or use) decision, or would have altered the physician’s conduct in some other that would have prevented the plaintiff’s injury.
Id. at 2.05-6. The accompanying footnote extends for nearly six pages of small (10 point) type and cites literally scores of cases. That is the magnitude of what the Meier article proposes to do away with.
To replace all this law – hundreds, if not thousands, of decisions throughout the country – the Meier article offers the concept of “counterfacts” (pp. 41-45). We’d never heard of that before, and this section of the article is notably lacking in supporting precedent, so we did what we usually do. We researched it. On Westlaw, allcases, the term appears exactly eleven times, and none of those cases use it the way the Meier article does, which is:
For purposes of failure-to-warn claims against pharmaceutical defendants, the “material” inquiry is whether the plaintiff would have avoided injury if the defendant had given the warning proposed by the plaintiff. But this “material” point is not a “fact” − it is a “counterfact.” As discussed above, the causation inquiry necessarily requires speculation about a world that never existed: “Hypothesis and speculation are essential for determining causal connection, since every statement of causal connection asserts what would have happened if the facts had been different.
* * * *
The pertinent question . . . is whether this testimony justifies summary judgment for the defendant. On this point, the difference between “facts” and “counterfacts” matters. The complicated body of law regarding when the evidentiary record justifies summary judgment on a material fact simply cannot be applied the same with regard to counterfacts. It is one thing to require a certain amount of evidence regarding a disputed event that actually happened, but it is nonsensical to apply this same standard to a hypothetical event that must be imagined.
Id. at 43-44 (footnote omitted). For these propositions – including calling the opposite proposition “nonsense” – the Meier article cites no precedent and only the most general sort of tort treatises.
Thus, the Meier article would replace the plaintiff’s burden of proof with respect to “counterfacts” – defined as facts bearing on the likelihood of a possible alternative result – with nothing, that is to say “hypothesis and speculation.” It proposes to overturn precedent nationwide (see Bexis’ book if you doubt us), and not just decisions having to do with the learned intermediary rule. Most tort cases involve proof of what would qualify as “counterfacts” as the Meier article defines them. All warning cases involve “what if” questions predicated on different warnings; only the recipients differ. Crashworthiness, for another example, involves determining what a plaintiff’s injuries in a vehicular accident would have been with a differently designed vehicle. Plaintiffs in other product liability litigation often claim that, had an additional safety feature been available, they would have used it. Damages, particularly in commercial torts, are generally intended to place the plaintiff in the position s/he would have been in had the tortious conduct not occurred.
The article’s “counterfact” concept, in short, is not only unprecedented, but proves far too much. That rationale – allowing “hypothesis and speculation” to substitute for facts in any case where an element of a claim involves an alternative set of facts – would push the law firmly towards the sort of absolute liability regime that Prof. Meier states that he favors. Needless to say, we do not agree.
The article also advocates (pp. 32-33) relaxing the causation burden by inserting the plaintiff into the causation matrix with allegations that, while the recommended treatment might stay the same, the accompanying informed consent discussion might have mentioned the alleged risk. We’ve addressed both of the two cases the article cites (as does Bexis’ book (pp 2.05-14 to -15). We continue to think that they are directly contrary to one of the primary policy bases for the learned intermediary rule: to prevent the law from interfering with or disrupting existing physician-patient relationships (Bexis’ book pp 2.03-6 to -9). The only way that a plaintiff establishes causation in this informed consent variant is to claim that, had s/he received the additional informed consent information, s/he would have disregarded the prescriber’s medical advice and refused the recommended drug. The article does not even address that inherent feature of letting plaintiffs testify (as they invariably will) that they would have rejected the medical treatment that their prescribers recommended.
Finally, we feel obliged to point out another way in which the Meier article diverges from the great weight of precedent, without acknowledging that it does so. On several occasions, it suggests that FDA-approved drug warnings are somehow superior to, or more impactful than, other sources of medical information that doctors and other health professionals rely on. Meier article at 3 (“a physician who is aware of academic literature discussing a particular risk might view that risk differently − and act differently − if a manufacturer deems the risk important enough to provide a warning”); 34 (“It is one thing for a doctor to be aware of information or risks because of the doctor’s own professional reading or conversations. It is quite another thing, however, for a doctor to receive an explicit warning accompanying the drug”); p. 35 (“a doctor who was already aware of the risk might nevertheless refrain from prescribing the drug if explicit warnings are given by the manufacturer”); p. 35 n.2 (“manufacturer warnings . . . facilitate a potential medical malpractice claim”). None of these statements is supported by any authority at all.
In this aspect, as well, the article (perhaps unintentionally) is contrary to established law. Most medical malpractice cases hold that manufacturer warnings do not establish the medical standard of care, and in many jurisdictions FDA-approved drug warnings are not even admissible.
[D]rug manufacturers do not design package inserts and PDR entries to establish a standard of medical care. Manufacturers write drug package inserts and PDR warnings for many reasons including compliance with FDA requirements, advertisement, the provision of useful information to physicians, and an attempt to limit the manufacturer’s liability. . . . Those considerations highlight the reasons expert testimony must accompany the introduction of PDR warnings to establish the applicable standard of care in prescribing a drug.
Morlino v. Medical Center, 706 A.2d 721, 729 (N.J. 1998). For a complete discussion of the law on this subject, see our post here. Far from being somehow superior to other sources of medical knowledge, a prescription medical product’s FDA-approved warnings are at best only a piece of the informational mix in medical malpractice/informed consent litigation, and they are in no way controlling or entitled to greater weight as the Meier article seems to suggest.
The author sought our views on his proposal. You asked for it; you got it.